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Executive Summary 
 
   This paper brings together a collection of ten case studies, from DFID 
programmes, that have had an impact in fragile states.  They show that 
in these instances aid can work even in poor policy environments. The 
parameters of this exercise sought successful interventions in the 
following three broad categories: 
 
•  Bringing about transformation in the governance environment 
(including programmes which improved the security sector, rule 
of law, increased transparency and accountability in the use of 
government revenues, increased government capacity, 
supported drivers of change). 
 
•  Improving social service delivery or social protection especially 
programmes concerning social safety nets, HIV/AIDS 
programmes, quick impact projects, central government service 
delivery systems. 
 
•  Stemming the negative spill-over effects from one country into 
the neighbouring country or region, including programmes which 
mitigated economic migration, the spread of communicable 
diseases, or conflict.  
 
   The main findings and conclusions derived from the case studies are 
presented in section I of the paper. The main conclusions are as 
follows: 
 
•  Political reform is possible in fragile states and the international 
community can contribute to it; however, it takes time (a 
minimum of five years) and needs to be accompanied by 
excellent understanding and analysis of the political economy.  
Taking a regional approach is also important in some 
circumstances. 
 
•  Innovative ‘co-production’ partnerships between state and non-
state actors (i.e. the private sector, NGOs, INGOs, community 
based organisations, and UN agencies) can be successful in 
improving service delivery and social protection in fragile states.  
 
•  Several aid instruments offer promise for ‘scaling up’ the 
response in fragile states (trust funds, social funds, and ‘joint 
programmes’), but for these to be sustainable in the long term, 
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In July 2004 the Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments (PRDE) team 
commissioned a number of case studies from DFID country offices in order to 
contribute to the January 2005 Senior Level Forum on Development 
Effectiveness in Fragile States. The case studies were intended to highlight 
examples of interventions that have had an impact, and that show that aid can 
work even where the policy environment is poor.  
 
The case studies were reviewed and the main findings synthesised. This 
section summarises the main findings and conclusions derived from this 
exercise. The synthesis focused on three questions: 
 
•  What do the case studies tell us about changing the governance 
environment in fragile states? 
 
•  What do the case studies tell us about improving the delivery of 
services (including security), and increasing social protection? 
 
•  Which instruments offer promising prospects for scaling up the 
response in fragile states and increasing the capacity of fragile states 




Supporting effective states 
 
A key ingredient for effective development in fragile states is that donors 
support reform.   This means being supportive of partners’ efforts to create the 
conditions for political stability, helping build government capacity, and 
encouraging political commitment to stronger policy environments. This 
section looks at what our case studies tell us about how the governance 
environment can be transformed in fragile states. 
  
•  Regional approaches are important to resolving some of the challenges 
that fragile states face – the international community can play an 
‘honest broker’ role, and provide seed funding, to bring distrustful 
governments around the table.  The South Caucasus Parliamentary 
Initiative (SCPI) is a good example of this. 
  
•  Civil society organisations are a key entry point as catalysts for political 
reform. They can gain the trust of all parties – LINKS (a small British 
non-governmental organisation) was a key catalyst in the SCPI, for 
example. They can also be a channel for helping citizens demand 
better governance. They can increase awareness of poor people about 
This working paper is intended to stimulate public discussion. It is not necessarily DFID or 
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their rights and give those people a greater voice.  This is the approach 
taken by the Political Empowerment Programme (PEP I) in Kenya. 
 
•  High-level political engagement from a bilateral donor can have a big 
impact and make a difference.  However, careful advance preparation 
to agree key messages and approaches with all stakeholders is vital.  
This is reflected in the UK’s intervention in Uzbekistan.  
 
•  Small, community based, projects can be effective in changing e 
political environment –the micro credit project in Uzbekistan is an 
example of how empowering the poor (in this case farmers) can have a 
significant impact on government policy; the Multi stakeholder Forestry 
Programme (MFP) in Indonesia also demonstrates the need to develop 
explicit links between communities and local governments in order to 
bring about policy change.  
 
•  Identifying political opportunities to engage is key –in Indonesia, a 
better understanding and analysis of the political economy (which DFID 
calls a ‘drivers of change’ approach) highlighted opportunities to 
influence forestry policy. 
 
•  The international community has an important role to play in setting 
standards that can improve the transparency and openness of 
governance – the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 
Azerbaijan and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust fund (ARTF), for 
example.  
 
•  Policy reform takes time - the health intervention in Uzbekistan, for 
example, had a minimum commitment of five years support from DFID 
and recognised the importance of long term partnership to bring about 
change; DFID has also made a long term commitment to support 
security sector reform in Sierra Leone and is already five years into that 
commitment. 
 
•  Programme design and implementation need to be flexible, particularly 
in post-conflict or highly unstable environments. In the case of Sierra 
Leone Security Sector Reform, the objective of reforming and 
strengthening the intelligence services was not included in the initial 
design but added after six months in response to a need that arose 
later.   
 
Improving the lives of the poor 
 
Recent experience shows that aid can work to meet urgent development 
needs, even where the state is fragile. Well-designed approaches are capable 
of both bringing about immediate improvement to the lives of poor people and 
acting as a springboard for long-term institutional strengthening and reform. 
This section summarises what the case studies tell us about improving the 
delivery of services (including security), and increasing social protection in 
fragile states.  
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•  The UN has an important leadership and coordination role in the 
delivery of services and social protection for the poor in fragile states – 
the involvement of UNDP and UNAIDS is one of the ingredients of the 
early success of the joint programme in Burma. 
 
•  The private sector has a critical role to play in improving services to the 
poor – the social marketing of insecticide treated bed nets in Kenya 
helped DFID to respond to a health priority in a way that was self-
sustaining without putting resources directly through the government.  
 
•  The international community needs to be more ready to fund recurrent 
expenditures in fragile states – in Afghanistan the ARTF supports the 
salaries of about 20,000 government workers (including teachers, 
nurses and doctors), many of whom are based outside Kabul. 
 
•  Security sector reform is an essential part of improving the lives of poor 
people – the Sierra Leone experience illustrates the need for both 
governance reforms and effective training and equipping of military and 
police forces. It also illustrates the importance of UK government 
departments working together effectively.  The costs of this type of 
integrated intervention are high - the UK has spent in the region of 
$158 million over the last four years. 
 
•  The community is a key entry point for poverty reduction interventions 
in fragile states – the social fund in Yemen, and the forestry 
programme in Indonesia, both demonstrate that community 
involvement (and/or mobilisation) increases national, subsequent 
ownership and management of resources. 
 
•  Partnerships between state actors and non-state actors (i.e. the private 
sector, faith-based organisations, and not-for-profit organisations) are 
important for longer term sustainability and capacity building – In 
Burma, government agencies (the National AIDS programme, for 
example) are an important part of the response, working in tandem with 
NGOs and UN agencies; in Indonesia, partnerships have been fostered 
between government, non-government organisations, community 
groups, and private sector organisations to improve forest management 
and use. 
 
Aid instruments and scaling up 
 
In fragile states, partnerships between the donor community and government 
are problematic.  The ways of working and aid instruments associated with the 
so-called good performers, such as PRSPs and direct budget support, are 
less appropriate in fragile states. This section highlights what our case studies 
tell us about the types of aid instruments that are appropriate in scaling up 
service delivery/social protection, how absorptive capacity can be increased, 
and how aid can be deployed without undermining the state in the longer 
term. 
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•  Trust funds can be a means of providing budgetary support to countries 
where fiduciary risk is high while simultaneously building the capacity of 
the state to manage and control its own budget.  It can also answer 
donor concerns about absorbing additional aid – the ARTF has become 
the preferred funding modality in Afghanistan, with £395 million 
committed for 2004/5. 
 
•  Pooled funding increases donor harmonisation and allows for a more 
programmatic approach in fragile states – in Burma pooled funding has 
enabled the donor community to work in partnership with civil society 
organisations and to scale up the response. Links have been 
maintained with the state, and indeed ministry of health officials are 
part of the coordinating structure.  Government providers have also 
successfully bid for funding. 
 
•  Social funds that bring communities, providers, and local and central 
government together are an effective way of improving social 
protection, service delivery, and livelihoods in fragile states – the 
Yemen social fund has attracted £225 million for 2004 – 2008 with 
funding from the World Bank, the EU, Dutch, KFW, UK, USAID and the 
Arab fund. Social funds need to align with government objectives and 
systems, if possible, so they do not undermine the state (the Yemen 
fund has been most successful in the education sector where it works 




Three broad conclusions can be drawn from the ten cases and the related 
findings: 
 
•  Political reform is possible in fragile states and the international 
community can contribute to it; however, it takes time and needs 
to be accompanied by excellent understanding and analysis of 
the political economy. 
 
•  Innovative partnerships between state and non-state actors (ie. 
the private sector, NGOs, community based organisations, and 
UN agencies) can be successful in improving service delivery 
and social protection in fragile states.  
 
•  Several aid instruments exist for ‘scaling up’ the response in 
fragile states (trust funds, social funds, and pooled funds), but 
for them to be sustainable in the longer term they need to be 
compatible with national policies and/or systems. 
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II  Building Effective States 
 





The South Caucasus Parliamentary Initiative (SCPI) is a framework for 
dialogue, exchange of views and joint analysis between the Parliaments of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, established on the basis of a Memorandum 
of Understanding signed between the three Parliaments in Tbilisi on 13 May 
2003. Parliamentary cooperation at the regional level is quite common. In the 
South Caucasus however regional contacts of any sort are rare. This is due 
mainly to many unresolved problems, especially between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Whilst everybody understands the obvious benefits of regional 
dialogue and contacts, few underestimate the difficulties involved in 
developing such processes. The South Caucasus Parliamentary Initiative has 
been hailed therefore as a significant positive step that could contribute 





SCPI emerged as a result of the work of a small British non-governmental 
organisation, LINKS. LINKS launched a dialogue between parliamentarians 
from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the beginning of 2001. There was at 
first great scepticism in the region, as well as in the funding community as to 
whether such initiative could work. The UK Government, through DFID, 
agreed to fund the first meeting, which was held in March 2001. By the time of 
the second meeting in 2002 it was clear that the conditions existed to develop 
the work further. Attempts to move the process to the region in February 2003 
proved premature as participants struggled to deal with enormous media 
pressure. By May 2003 however the initiative could be launched formally and 
the three parliaments signed a Memorandum of Understanding outlining the 
working modalities. The Memorandum provides for half yearly plenary 
assemblies with the participation of ten parliamentarians from each side, and 
a Presidium of three MPs from each side. From this point onwards ownership 
of SCPI has been very much with the parliaments of the three countries. The 
initiative now has a rotating Chairmanship and a secretariat, as well as 





Since the signing of the MOU two plenary assemblies have been held – the 
first in Scotland in December 2003 and the second in Sofia in July 2004. Both 
events were highly evaluated both by participants, as well as by outside 
observers. The parliament of Georgia held the Chairmanship from January to 
June 2004, and the Armenian Parliament took over in July 2004. They are 
                                            
1 Dennis Sammut (LINKS) 
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expected to hand over to the Azerbaijan Parliament in January 2005. Each 
incoming chairmanship presents a programme of work to the plenary 
Assembly and once approved this becomes the basis for activity for the 
duration of that Chairmanship. The Chairmanship and the Presidium provide 
the political direction of SCPI. The presidium has initiated high level contacts 
with the Council of Europe, the European Union, the OSCE, the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Baltic Parliamentary Assembly. 
 
A big part of the challenge of SCPI is to build enough trust between the sides 
to ensure that work can be done together. The Secretariat of SCPI – with 
members from the three countries, implements the decision of the Executive 
organs and prepares meetings. The Secretariat has developed a mirror 
archive for the SCPI documentation in the three countries; it has also 
produced a Directory of the Parliaments of the South Caucasus. Other more 
ambitious projects are being considered. From July 2005 SCPI will have its 
own Executive Secretary. During the 2
nd Plenary Meeting, the Bye Laws of 
SCPI were approved so that the process could be regularly and transparently 
regulated. 
 
The Role Of International Support 
 
Everybody appreciates that external support was crucial for SCPI to come to 
existence and for its work in the early years. LINKS proved an ideal 
intermediary in this regard. Its small size was amply compensated by long 
experience of work in the South Caucasus and knowledge of the key actors. It 
was therefore an acceptable and friendly interlocutor for the three parliaments. 
In fact one can argue that if a larger inter state organization like the OSCE 
had pushed for this initiative its intentions may have been misunderstood. 
LINKS was able also to build a good rapport with a range of important 
European institutions and so the Parliaments of UK, Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Scotland, as well as the EU, OSCE, CofE, BPA and NATO-PA 
were engaged in the process. They extended their moral support to the 
initiative and opened their doors for its meetings. Since January 2004 LINKS 
has been reducing its role in SCPI in favour of the emerging SCPI organs. 
Until June 2005 LINKS will have the role of Special Adviser as well as other 
administrative and facilitation tasks. 
 
International support was also essential for providing funding.  The UK 
Government has been the largest funder of SCPI so far. There have also 
been contributions from the Governments of the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
It is worth noting, on the funding issue, that the three Parliaments of the South 
Caucasus are not yet in a position where they can support the initiative 
through domestic resources. Even if funding had been available initially, it is 
not clear that there would have been sufficient political will from all parties to 
support the process in its nascent phase. The UK government is to be 
commended for sticking with the initiative, even at a stage when it looked as 
though it might falter, a decision that was crucial to its eventual success. 
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SCPI is not a fully-fledged regional parliamentary assembly. Indeed such an 
assembly is for the moment not a realistic preposition. It does however 
provide for a dynamic forum of interaction between the Parliaments of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia that has already made a modest 
contribution towards better understanding between the three countries. It is a 
good example of an initiative that emerged from civil society but was able to 
engage effectively with state actors. In some ways it is also a good example of 
how flexible, and to a certain extent risky, funding can achieve important 
breakthroughs. 
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Uzbekistan is a powerful player within Central Asia: It is the world's second-
largest cotton exporter, a large producer of gold and oil, a regionally 
significant producer of chemicals and machinery and it has the largest 
population in the region. As a dry, land-locked country, more than 60% of its 
population live in densely populated rural communities.  It is also one of the 
poorest countries in the CIS (Commonwealth Independent States) with an 
income per capita of US $310
3 and 44% of the population living on less than 
$2.15
4 per day.  Since independence in 1991, a sharp increase in the 
inequality of income distribution has hurt the lower ranks of society. 
 
State interference in Uzbekistan is extensive
5. Following independence, the 
government sought to prop up its Soviet-style command economy with 
subsidies and tight controls on production and prices. Uzbekistan responded 
to the negative external conditions generated by the Asian and Russian 
financial crises by emphasizing import substitute industrialization and by 
tightening export and currency controls within its already largely closed 
economy. The government, while aware of the need to improve the 
investment climate, sponsors measures that often increase the government's 
control over business decisions. Borders with other Central Asian countries 
have been closed and - in the case of Tajikistan – mined, in order to limit trade 
opportunities and the movement of people. 
 
Over twelve years of independence, Uzbekistan has proven to be one of the 
most repressive countries in the Central Asia region. Now a key ally in the 
U.S. led "war against terrorism," (Uzbekistan has provided basing and 
overflight permission for U.S. and coalition forces) it has made some attempts 
to convince the international community that it is improving its human rights 
record. However, the situation remains grave, with systematic torture of 
detainees, persecution of Muslims who practice Islam outside of state 
controlled structures, and harassment of human rights defenders and 
opposition members. 
 
Uzbekistan probably hosts one of the most powerful underground 
organizations of Islamic fundamentalists in the region.  The main source of 
influence of the Hizb ut-Tahrir [the radical international organization dedicated 
to the unification of all Muslims in the world into a single Caliphate state] is 
located in Uzbekistan.  
                                            
2
 Roy Trivedy 
3 Source: World Bank Making Transition Work for Everyone, World Development Indicators and other World Bank 
estimates, using 2002 data. National Poverty lines are based on Government estimates. 
4 The World bank and others use a poverty line of £2 ($2.15) a day for the Europe and Central Asia region as the $1 
($1.08) a day poverty line is not appropriate for these countries due to the higher needs for heating, clothing and food 
in a cold climate. 
5 For example, whilst foreign exchange controls were loosened, the trade regime was made even more restrictive and 
limits in access to domestic cash have held back the development of an operational foreign exchange market. Only a 
few large-scale enterprises have been privatised and, despite government resolutions targeting agricultural reforms, 
state control over the types of crops that farms are to grow and State purchases of the cotton crop and more than a 
half of wheat crop, remains largely in place. 
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It is widely agreed that poverty and Islamic fundamentalism compounded by 
this sort of political repression is generating desperate resolve in people who 
have nothing to lose.  There is a high threat of terrorism. The Jihad Islamic 
Group (JIG), a successor to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an 
organization allied with al Qaeda have claimed responsibility for at least five 
suicide-bomb blasts seen this year (2004).  
 
In this hostile environment for pro-poor growth and the empowerment of the 
poor, the messages from the International Community to the Uzbek 
government have not always been coherent and consistent.  This has made it 
difficult to work together in support of positive change.  In particular, there 
have been different views about the government’s progress with its economic 
reform agenda, its role as an important regional player, its approach to human 
rights’ abuses and its support to the “war on terror”. 
 
DFID’s bilateral aid programme has been surprisingly successful.  However, 
as a small player in Uzbekistan, we have been unable to press for significant 
change without the support of the larger players.   This case study explains 
how DFID was provided with, and took, the opportunity to change the nature 
of the policy dialogue between the government and the international 
community.  It remains to be seen whether this intervention will deliver lasting 




DFID has been active in Uzbekistan since 1992. In light of ongoing political, 
social and economic problems in Uzbekistan, DFID has made use of both aid 
and non-aid instruments to influence policy decisions and work towards 
poverty reduction.  The three core areas of our approach are: 
 
   Influencing multilaterals - Work with the EBRD and other agencies 
(World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank) in support of the 
economic and political benchmarks set out in EBRD’s 2003 Country 
Strategy for Uzbekistan;  
   Policy dialogue – Highlighting Uzbekistan’s weaknesses to other donors 
and encouraging their engagement with the issues identified; and 
   Bilateral engagement - Exploring possibilities of working with civil society 
actors in designing and developing activities on our thematic and 
regional priorities (in particular, health, statistics and livelihoods). 
 
 
Influencing Multilaterals & Policy Dialogue (Success Criteria: Support 
Drivers of Change)  
 
In 2003, DFID was provided with a unique opportunity to alter the policy 
dialogue between the government of Uzbekistan and the international 
community.  The DFID Secretary of State, Rt. Hon Claire Short, as the 
Governor of the EBRD Board, gave a keynote speech at the 2003 EBRD 
Annual Meeting.  The Meeting was due to take place in Uzbekistan – a 
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controversial location because of its deteriorating economic and political 
situation.   
 
In concert with the EBRD President, the UK Government decided to take full 
advantage of both this opportunity and the Bank’s unique political mandate to 
deliver some tough messages to the Uzbek government on political and 
economic reform.  In order to do this DFID worked with key partners in the 
run-up to the meeting.  Our preparations included: 
  
   Regular high-level meetings between the Secretary of State (Clare 
Short) and the President of the EBRD (Jean Lemierre), to agree key 
messages and how best to relay these to key actors (including to 
President Karimov, the Presidents of the other Central Asian Republics, 
the EBRD Shareholders, and the International Financial Institutions). 
 
   Regular Whitehall meetings to ensure that the key messages included, 
and were consistent with, wider UK policy towards Uzbekistan.  The 
British Ambassador in Tashkent played a supportive role in this process. 
 
   Discussions with EBRD shareholders (at all levels up to Minister), to 
encourage them to attend and to support the key messages at the 
Annual Meetings. 
 
   Regular meetings with NGOs to ensure that the meeting provided the 
space for them to voice their concerns and views.  
 
   Support to the EBRD to develop economic and political benchmarks in 
its Strategy for Uzbekistan (presented to the EBRD Board in March 
2003).  Our view was that this would provide the Bank with a tool through 
which key stakeholders and international financial institutions could 
discuss the key issues and monitor their progress in a consistent, 
transparent way.    
 
   Cooperation with the United Nations special rapporteur on torture who 
presented findings from a mission to Uzbekistan to the U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights in April 2003. He stated that torture was "systematic," 
and concluded that torture was "pervasive and persistent . . . throughout 
the investigation process." In response, the government promised a 
National Action Plan to combat torture, implementing many of the special 
rapporteur's recommendations.   
 
At the EBRD Annual Meeting, the DFID Secretary of State, Rt. Hon Claire 
Short highlighted the deficiencies of the country’s human rights and the lack of 
political openness to the donor community.  Her opening speech was 
broadcast live in Uzbekistan, with EBRD providing the interpretation to ensure 
tough messages were delivered.  This facilitated an honest discussion 
between the international community and the Uzbek government. The 
meeting focussed unprecedented attention on the Uzbek authorities’ poor 
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commitment to EBRD’s political mandate and enabled constructive follow-on 
discussions with other key players, especially the US
6.    
 
Since then a number of events have occurred: 
 
   EBRD has adjusted the focus of its activities so that it targets mainly the 
private sector. Public sector projects will only be considered if they have 
direct benefits for the Uzbek people, or if they involve neighbouring 
countries.  In emphasising its support for the Uzbek people, the Bank 
reinforced its commitment to sustain a good level of engagement with 
Uzbekistan. This position was fully supported by the UK and Human 
Rights NGO’s as the best way for EBRD to continue to support the 
people of Uzbekistan.  
 
   In February 2004, the Bank’s Board of Directors met influential figures 
within the Uzbek government to continue the policy dialogue. This 
dialogue has continued to deliver the key messages and helped to inform 
the next country strategy, due in 2005. 
 
   In July 2004, the US State Department announced that $18 million in 
economic aid to Uzbekistan would be suspended because of its failure to 
carry out a promised political liberalization or improve its human rights 
record. The United States’ supplementary aid to the Uzbek government 
is now conditional on "substantial and continuing progress" in the field of 
human rights, and the Bush administration must certify every six months 
that this condition is being fulfilled.  Uzbekistan will still receive the 
designated U.S. funds under a national interest waiver (to avoid the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) but 
nevertheless the much-needed political message about U.S. 
dissatisfaction over the Uzbek government’s human rights record has 
been made.   
 
   The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United 
Nations Development Program, and individual countries with 
representations in Tashkent have actively participated in discussions on 
the National Action Plan to combat torture. Many of these interlocutors 
have promised financial and other support to implement the 
recommendations of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture. 
 
   The EBRD, headed by the Secretary General, has conducted two 
monitoring missions to assess the Country’s progress against the 
benchmarks.  The IMF and World Bank contributed to these discussions.  
Consequently, these IFIs and many bilateral aid agencies are speaking 
with a more united voice about the issues that need to be addressed.  
 
                                            
6 The resignation of Clare Short the following week was portrayed by the Uzbek government as a result of the 
“falsehoods” she had delivered in her speech.  Her resignation was a setback to DFID/HMG’s ability to advance its 
work at a faster rate. 
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   The World Bank has focussed its interventions more in areas that 
specifically support pro-poor development and regional  cooperation.   
 
   There has been very limited impact on the policies of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB).  Some donors have abstained from voting on 
certain projects.  But the aid spend continues to be high. 
 
   Japan, which is not concerned about the problems of observance of 
human rights and freedom of speech in Uzbekistan, continues to pour 
money into the country to develop alternative supplies of oil and gas.  
Recent reports note that Tashkent is planning to obtain loans totalling 
592.9 million US dollars from the Japanese Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC) to develop the oil and gas sectors. 
 
   The US - which is not indifferent to the routes taken for laying the future 
strategic oil and gas pipelines nor to the military opportunities provided 
by Uzbekistan (3,000 US soldiers are based here to support the anti-
terrorist operation in Afghanistan) – continues to maintain a large military 
spend to the country.  
 
   The EBRD’s assessment of Uzbekistan’s progress against the seven set 
benchmarks states that there had been some, albeit limited, progress in 
meeting the Bank’s economic and political benchmarks. 
 
 
Bilateral engagement (Success criteria: Improve Rule of Law, Support 
Driver of Change and Encourage Pro-Poor Growth).   
 
In the run-up to the EBRD Annual Meeting, DFID made a strategic decision 
not to engage in any new bilateral projects, until the key messages had been 
delivered.   This decision was an important part of our “influencing strategy”.  
However, it did not reflect the performance of our bilateral interventions – the 
Bulungur Institutional Strengthening and Micro-Credit project (BISAMP) and 
support to the Primary Health Care Reform – which had been surprisingly 
successful.  
 
Our experience from the bilateral aid programme (Fuller details attached at 
Annex A) illustrated that, despite a hostile environment, it is still possible to 
find entry points which support drivers for change, influence Government 
policy, and build sustainable institutions and reforms in selected areas.   
 
In our view, the successes were due to: 
 
   The identification of the main drivers for change, and what their shared 
needs were. 
   Working in a joined-up, coordinated way with all the donors and domestic 
players to deliver reform most effectively (health reform). 
   Emphasis on local ownership and involvement of the local community in 
problem resolution right from the start (rural livelihoods).  
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   The employment of local staff and keeping a level playing field between 
the salaries of consultant salaries and local salaries.  
   The delivery of real, and ongoing, benefits to the drivers for change (e.g. 
relevant training and advice for improving production methods/service 





In summary, this experience has highlighted the following lessons for small 
programmes in difficult political environments: 
 
•  There are usually some entry points for successful bilateral interventions. 
 
•  A small, but successful bilateral aid programme is not sufficient to deliver 
high-level change in a country, but it does provide an informed position as 
to the development challenges facing the country. 
 
•  Be prepared to stand back from the detail and identify alternative ways of 
influencing the policy agenda. 
 
•  Important messages from the international community to Governments 
need to be agreed, consistent, delivered in many different guises and 
monitored in a regular and transparent way. 
 
•  Occasional, focussed Ministerial and high level UK inputs with key 
partners can transform the status quo but…..  
 
•  ….they need to be followed up with supportive bilateral and multilateral 
interventions in order to deliver lasting change.  
 
•  In the international community, geo-political issues often over-ride the 
human rights and development challenges in-country.  Finding the 
common ground between the two agendas may be impossible, but it is 
possible to clarify the different objectives, to ensure that support of one 





The Bulungur Institutional Strengthening and Micro-Credit project 
(BISAMP) 
 
Between 1997-2001 DFID implemented the BISAMP project. This provided 
£440,000 of technical assistance and $100,000 capital for the micro-credit 
fund. The objective of this project was to reduce poverty in rural areas by 
assisting private farmers in the Bulungur Rayon of Samarkand Oblast to 
establish and operate farmers associations. Through these associations 
farmers gained support for developing institutions that were financially more 
independent from the state, legal back-up for securing independent private 
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farming and better access to input supplies (including credit) and markets. 
This is essential in a country where the poor - as individuals - have no voice, 
there is incomplete land reform, extensive government intervention, state 
procurement of various crops and an overall environment that is hostile to pro-
poor growth. 
 
An ex-post evaluation of the project was carried out in 2002. This highlighted 
the positive impact the project has had in encouraging local banking to be 
more supportive of farmer organisations and local regional administrations to 
be more supportive of the establishment of private farmers. Despite the hostile 
environment in which the project was operating, it was largely successful in 
influencing Government policies and generated increased support for private 
farming and necessary infrastructure and encouraged a new decree on ‘Non 
Banking Micro-Credit Institutions’ in 2002. The project was successful in 
supporting drivers of change: individual private farmers who opted to leave the 
Post-Soviet large farm enterprises to farm their land individually; the Private 
Farmers Association, groups of farmers (including female entrepreneurs) who 
work together; and the cooperative that brings together the groups for joint 
action and service delivery. In addition the bottom up cooperative 
development has been instrumental in securing the ‘rule of Law’ through the 
protection of access rights to land and inputs and markets for the private 
farmers and their groups. The response of other donors in Uzbekistan is 
testimony to the success of the project: the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank have undertaken micro credit projects in Uzbekistan that 
incorporate several aspects that were pioneered by the BISAMP project. 
 
Perhaps the fundamental success of this project, however, is the sustainability 
of the institution that it established. The successor to the BISAMP project (an 
independent farmers associations cooperative, registered in 2000), Madadcor  
- Uzbek for ‘Hope’ - operates independently of DFID financial support with 
local staff – many of who were trained under the BISAMP project. Madadcor is 
a diversified, democratically managed farmers’ organisation that provides 
small-scale farmers and businesswomen with access to services and benefits 
they are unable to access individually (such as the provision of micro credits, 
input supply and marketing support, accountancy, taxation and legal 
support)
7. Despite the challenging socio-economic and legal situation in 
Uzbekistan, Madadcor has generated a wide range of economic, social, and 
professional benefits for its participants, including the empowerment of 
women in the traditional rural Uzbek community (half the credit beneficiaries 
from the micro-credit fund are women). Madadcor partners are now sharing 
the lessons and expertise that has been generated as a result of the BISAMP 
Project with neighbouring districts along the Uzbek and Tajik borders to 
explore the potential for a cross-border regional development initiative in the 
Uzbek/Tajik Zarafshan Valley. Madadcor has also hosted a number of World 
Bank and TACIS (EC) delegations that have wanted to learn from the rare 
case of sustainable institutional and developmental benefits in a hostile 
environment. 
                                            
7 The farmers’ association also works on the development of sustainable farming and water management and 
provision of loans to develop a rural off-farm private sector, rural job creation (in particular for women), the growing of 
alternative crops and delivery of marketing services to help in their sale. 
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Key lessons to take from this experience: 
 
   Delivery of real benefits to its members is the most significant guarantor 
for sustainable success (e.g. micro-credit fund, marketing support, 
further indication of niche production and training and advice for 
improving production methods and support for income generation and 
business development for women); 
   Employment of local staff and connection between staff salaries and 
local salaries; and 
   Local ownership and involvement of the local community in problem 
resolution.  
 
Support to the Primary Health Care Reform Programme 
 
As part of the World Bank Support to Primary Health Care (PHC) reform in 
Uzbekistan, DFID provided £1,000,000 to improve the quality and accessibility 
of primary health care to the rural poor. DFID support focused on the 
development of training in general practice. This had a considerable impact 
through both its contribution to the improvement of the health status of the 
population of Uzbekistan and by encouraging engagement with the 
Government.  Evidence of the government’s buy-in to the programme is the 
establishment by Ministerial Decree of a Steering Committee for GP 
Education and the national adoption of the training GP trainers programme 
(devised by the Trainers as part of the DFID Project). 
 
Key lessons learnt: 
 
   Don’t fight the system; accept the realities and work within them. 
   Sufficient budget flexibility to allow training institutions to purchase their 
own essential equipment, rather than waiting for it to be delivered by the 
donor. 
   Importance of long-term commitment by the donor to the project if the 
aim is to facilitate major policy reform (minimum five years). 
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The Political Empowerment Programme (PEP I) began in April 2000. The 
overall aim of the programme was to contribute towards a genuine political 
system that allows all groups and individuals in society to freely advocate their 
position, and participate effectively in the democratisation and decision-
making processes in Kenya. Through the programme, Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) were identified and supported to create awareness 
among poor people on civil and political rights and duties. The programme 
also worked to have the twin objective of building the capacity of CSOs and 
through them, the citizens, for effective demand of their entitlements. These 
CSO groups also served to articulate the views and interests of the poor as 
well as engage in an effective dialogue with the Government. 
 
By the year 2000, it was clear to DFID that the governance problems lay at 
the heart of the economic and political malaise affecting Kenya. These 
problems manifested themselves through pervasive corruption and gross 
inefficiencies in the performance of state institutions and public services. Apart 
from this, there was a near collapse of the public services, dismal 
performance by constitutional institutions meant to provide checks and 
balances to an increasingly centralized executive with immense powers over 
and above other institutions meant to provide constitutional bulwarks.   
 
The relationship between donors and the government were poor as was the 
relationship between the governed and their government. This situation called 
for a programme that would work to rekindle the public debate, re-energize 
civic action, resuscitate the stifled democratic processes, support 
constitutional reforms, and work towards the entrenchment of citizens’ 




Through PEP I, DFID entered into a joint multi donor funding arrangement for 
the civic education component with like minded donors. The objective of the 
basket was to provide a collaborative and coherent framework for donor 
support towards the consolidation of a mature political culture in Kenya. This 
would enable groups and individuals to remain aware and articulate their 
rights and obligations and freely advocate their positions to the relevant 
government authorities. The basket fund provided a window of opportunity for 
the integration of civil and political rights issues with a broader aspect of social 
and economic change and for beginning to support more grass root 
organizations outside urban areas. 
 
The project targeted about a one hundred civil society groups that had 
coalesced around the five consortia. To select participating CSOs, an 
elaborate mechanism was developed. Individual organizations submitted 
                                            
8 Martin Oloo Governance Adviser, DFID Kenya, November 2004 
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funding proposals to the donor group. The donor group’s steering committee 
and the Technical Assistance Team decided on which proposals to fund. A 
Financial Management Agent  (Private sector provider) managed all 
procurements and disbursements against the programme while the CSOs 
used a joint curriculum to deliver a nationwide civic education programme.  
 
The Programme had a number of components clustered around five outputs. 
These were: civic education, domestic observation of the 2002 General 
elections, an inclusive policy dialogue, independent research on specific 
issues such as the engendering the budget process, and corruption, and 
support to democratic institutions especially strengthening the Parliament. 
 
The rationale for basket funding approach grew from the bad experience with 
separate bilateral funding to civic education in the past, which had been 
somewhat ad hoc and piecemeal. It was clear therefore that there was much 
to be gained from supporting genuine governance activities through a better 
funding mechanism that would ensure a coherent approach among donors 
and civil society players. 
 





A project completion review was commissioned, at the end of the project 
which made a number of observations, reflecting both the strengths and the 
areas that needed strengthening, which have since been factored into the 
design of the second phase of the Political Empowerment Programme.  
 
The first observation centred on the importance of staying engaged as 
reflected by the fact that DFID Kenya had worked through this programme 
during a very difficult time. This, no doubt, reinforced the need to have 
innovative and creative programmes in a poor policy environment. PEP one 
was able to make immense contribution to the democratisation process, 
facilitated the increase in voice, and rights awareness making a significant 
contribution in the 2002 electoral process. 
 
PEP I made significant contribution to Kenya’s transition to the democratic 
rule through sustaining high numbers of women voters, elected and 
nominated women members of Parliament in a process that had been 
hitherto, largely male dominated. The Kenya Domestic Observation project, 
which fell under the PEP I, was rated as a major success and contributed to 
the reduction of electoral irregularities, while the Engendering Political Project 
served to mobilize a significant number of women political players. 
 
Kenya’s democratic gains are however at the infancy stage especially when 
begins to observe the waning of the euphoria and promises associated with 
the arrival of the new National Rainbow Coalition government. As the reality of 
challenges creep in and citizens begin to openly express their disillusionment 
with the NARC government, the mood has been that of both raised 
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expectations and an apparent despair. While corruption is still endemic, efforts 
to bring to book those responsible for the numerous cases of corruption 
remain largely unrealised. The Constitutional Review process is caught up in 
personality based disagreements without an apparently clear path towards it 
conclusion. 
 
This creates both an opportunity and threat to the phase two of the PEP, 
which is now underway. The opportunities and threats to widespread political 
empowerment makes the case of how to develop Kenyan state into a neutral 
arbiter of conflicting interests and struggles even more urgent.  With this 
coordinated funding mechanism, it was easier and more efficient; to work in a 
wide range of Geographical areas, employ a range of methodologies and 
foster effective horizontal and vertical linkages among different interest 
groups. And not to be forgotten, the mechanism pooled political risks among 




The Phase two of the project builds on the gains and takes on the challenges 
of phase one to the next level. There is now a government-driven 
Governance, Justice, Law and Order sector programme (GJLOS), for which 
donors have joined hands into a basket group with the aim of entrenching the 
necessary reforms in the sector with a view to improving, access to justice, 
better realization and protection of human rights. When it is finally approved, 
the new constitution of Kenya is likely to have a better and more modern Bill 
of Rights that encapsulates the three-generations of human rights issues in 
consonant with the best practice.  
 
While the scaling up was a deliberate design in providing for a second phase 
to build onto the gains of the first phase, developments that followed the loss 
of the long reign of the one dominant party in Kenya, KANU, and the 
departure of the long serving President Moi, opened up new democratic 
space.  
 
Targeting the Poor 
 
The Civil Society groups that form the consortia through whom PEP I worked 
on civic education had a national and grass root membership that represented 
the interests of the poor, the disadvantaged men and women.  The elite based 
groups in Nairobi are often best placed to influence policy. While recognizing 
that the interests of elite groups may not be necessarily congruent, one of the 
aims of the programme was to build vertical linkages between these groups 
and those for and of the poor. Horizontal linkages between the groups and 
made up directly of poorer interest groups were also developed to promote 




We have observed that staying engaged in the fragile states can make the 
difference in governance as the PEP I programme demonstrates. The Political 
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Empowerment approach is one that targets the citizens directly and civil 
society groups. It works on the demand side to enable citizens exert pressure 
on their government and elected officials for an enhanced accountability in 
policy and political process. The recent developments in Kenya indicate a 
need however to work on several tracks that includes the demand and the 
supply side. While working with Government it is also critical to work with the 
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Azerbaijan is an “other LIC” (DAC classification) country with an average GNI 
p.c. of $710 in 2002.   As a former Soviet state it has only a short history of 
independent government.  Conflict with Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-
Karabakh in the early-1990s saw Azerbaijan lose 18% of its territory, and led 
to approximately 800,000 internal refugees.  The conflict has remained 
“frozen” since the 1994 ceasefire, but is a point of continuing instability.   
Government since then has been dominated by one family – first under 
President Heydar Aliev, and subsequently (from 2003 onwards) his son Ilham 
Aliev.  In 2004 Transparency International rate Azerbaijan 140
th= (from 145 
countries surveyed) on their corruption perception index.  Azerbaijan is 
dependent on oil and gas exports – which presently account for 86% of export 
income, and this will rise significantly when new pipelines are completed in 
2005 and 2006.   
 
In short, Azerbaijan is a “fragile” state – it is highly vulnerable to a combination 
of impacts more commonly known as the “resource curse” whereby states 
heavily dependent upon the extractives sector have been shown to be 




The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
11 was launched by UK 
Prime Minister in 2002 to address one of the causes of the resource curse – a 
lack of transparency of oil, gas, and mining revenues in developing countries.  
This lack of transparency in turn can generate poor governance and conflict, 
as the relationship between state and citizen weakens in favour of maintaining 
(or capturing) those few commercial relationships that provide the majority of 
the income of the state.  A lack of transparency can also lead to unproductive 
expenditure as governments seek to “pay off” civil society, or rent seeking 
from groups with an unrealistic understanding of the resources available. 
 
Key outcomes / Impacts 
 
The Government of Azerbaijan was one of the first countries to commit to 
implementing EITI.
12  Thus far, outcomes and impacts have been dominated 
by the creation of a multi-stakeholder accountability mechanism.  The 
Government of Azerbaijan, international, national, and state-owned oil and 
gas companies, and a local NGO coalition on transparency signed an 
agreement on 24 November 2004 regarding how payments by companies, 
                                            
9 Sefton Darby 2004 
10 See Collier et al (2003), Breaking the conflict trap; Brannon, I. and Collier, P. (eds), Natural resources and violent 
conflict, and Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004), “The challenge of reducing the global incidence of civil war”, 
Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper. 
11 For more information see http://www.eitransparency.org  
12 See the statement made by Ilham Aliyev, then Vice-President of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic 
(SOCAR), and subsequently President, made at the Lancaster House EITI conference in June 2003 at: 
http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/eitidraftreportazerbiajan.pdf 
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and revenues received by government, would be reported and scrutinised.  It 
is the creation of this mechanism that will be key to re-establishing an 
accountability link between civil society and government regarding 
Azerbaijan’s substantial extractives resources.
13 
 
All parties expect that a first set of payments and revenues figures, collated by 
an independent auditor appointed by a committee with representatives from 
all sides, will be published by early 2005. 
 
Needless to say, it is too early to establish what the key outcomes and 
impacts will be.  It is hoped that increased transparency and accountability will 
improve the governance situation, make it more difficult for unproductive or 
rent-seeking economic behaviour to be promoted by the state, and 
subsequently remove two key drivers of conflict. 
 
Design features key to success 
 
The key design features of EITI are: 
 
•  It is a country-led approach:  While EITI principles and policy are 
agreed and set at an international level, the responsibility for the 
development of reporting methodology lies with individual EITI 
countries.    
 
•  A multi-stakeholder approach: While the Government of Azerbaijan is 
ultimately responsible for setting the transparency environment, a 
fundamental principle of EITI is that it involves the active participation 
of all companies operating in the country, and civil society groups. 
 
•  Guarding the brand:  EITI is an international initiative, and as such, 
other developing countries implementing EITI, as well as donors, 
international companies, and NGOs all have a clear interest in 
maintaining the credibility of the initiative.  Because of this, international 
partners “police” the brand by engaging with governments they 
perceive to not be upholding the key EITI principles. 
 
 
Can it be scaled up? 
 
The extractives sector in Azerbaijan is the dominant sector, so it may not be 
worth expanding it to other sectors.  What EITI does do is provide a reliable 
set of figures on government revenues that can then be used to inform wider 
public financial management programmes. 
 
Internationally the most obvious way to “scale up” EITI is to have more 
countries choosing to implement it.  At present, in addition to Azerbaijan, 
Ghana, the Kyrgyz Republic, Nigeria, Congo, and Sao Tome e Principe have 
                                            
13 For copies of this agreement see http://www.eitransparency.org/azeribaijanmou.htm.  See also the Government of 
Azerbaijan’s statements on EITI at: http://www.oilfund.az/search.php?get=EITI  The views of the NGO coalition for 
transparency can be found at: http://www.eiti-az.org/eng-index.php  
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committed to implementing EITI.  Considering the relative newness of the 
initiative, this is a good start, but still but a small proportion of the number of 
extractives-dependent developing countries.  DFID, and it’s main partner in 
implementing the initiative – the World Bank – are now seeking to find other 
donor partners to help support implementation of the initiative in other 




•  Strong, top-level political engagement: Political engagement on EITI 
between the Government of Azerbaijan and the UK government occurs 
at a senior level
14.  Indicating how important we see the initiative to be 
has in-turn stimulated serious engagement from the Government of 
Azerbaijan. 
 
•  Engagement of the IFIs:  The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank (through the IFC) have 
provided considerable financial support to projects to help Azerbaijan 
develop and export its oil and gas.  On the back of these investments, 
both institutions have pushed the importance of transparency with the 
Government of Azerbaijan. 
 
•  Constant stakeholder management:  The UK Government – through 
the Embassy in Baku, as well as through DFID – have played a key 
stakeholder management role in ensuring that all parties are being 
consulted and engaged in the process.  Ensuring, in particular, that civil 
society has a credible role in the process has been key. 
 
•  Building capacity in government and civil society: Although funding on 
capacity building for both has yet to take place, we place considerable 
importance on ensuring that the Government of Azerbaijan and the 
NGO coalition both develop the long-term capacity to remain engaged 




Thus far the primary cost has been the time required by FCO and DFID staff 
to create the UK and IFI engagement, and subsequent stakeholder 
management.  For most of 2004 this has been the equivalent of one full-time 
policy analyst, though this has been split across several individuals in Baku 
and in London.  DFID has recently appointed a full-time project officer on the 
ground to manage the process, at a cost of approximately £27k including non-
salary costs.  It is expected that this post will be a short-term one (less than 
one year) to help support EITI in Azerbaijan as it moves from a political phase 
(agreement of process), to a delivery phase, in which capacity building in 
Government and civil society will be necessary to make the process 
sustainable 
                                            
14 Most recently, for example, EITI was included in the joint communiqué issued following the meeting of Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and President Aliev on 14 December 2004 – see 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/page6776.asp 
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The Government of Azerbaijan has asked for support to pay for the costs of 
establishing a secretariat within the State Oil Fund (the part of government 
that leads on EITI), as most of the work – both policy development as well as 
administrative – is presently being carried out by the executive director of the 
fund.  We will almost certainly support this, either through funds from the 
regional programme, or from the EITI trust fund based in the World Bank.  
Costs to pay for a fulltime secretariat based in the oil fund would probably not 
exceed more than £20k - £40k. 
 
The World Bank also has a development grant facility available to support 
EITI by building capacity Government and civil society.  Five proposals have 
been received from local NGO groups for different forms of capacity building, 
and we are currently evaluating them.  Again the cost is quite small – perhaps 
around £30k.   
 
Costs associated with the employment of an independent auditor to produce 
six-monthly reports will be split between the state oil fund, and the companies 
operating in Azerbaijan. 
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Indonesia’s forests under President Suharto were managed centrally by the 
State. Forests were managed for timber to contribute to growth. Forest (land) 
use concessions were awarded to the private sector. This favoured a coalition 
of bureaucrats, businessmen and the military. Peasants, labourers, small 
businessmen and indigenous groups lacked organisation and influence. Their 
access to and profit share from forest (land) resources remained minimal. The 
situation was particularly poignant for the millions of indigenous people who 
saw their ancestral hold over forest (land) gradually erode. 
 
The coalition collapsed during and immediately following the Asia Financial 
Crisis and downfall of Suharto. Peasants, labourers, small businessmen and 
indigenous groups grabbed this opportunity to stake their claims. Logging 
camps and equipments were destroyed, land was invaded and the State lost 
control. To survive, some ‘big business’ operators negotiated and in some 
places fragile arrangements for profit-sharing and co-management emerged. 
The main outcome from the collapse of the state in 1997-98, however, was 
that Indonesia’s forests fell into a ‘tragedy of the (unmanaged) commons’. 
 
The period following Suharto’s downfall has witnessed a steady, but at times 
also chaotic, transition to democracy. In 2001 alone, the Minister of Forestry 
changed 4 times. A far reaching but ill-prepared process of decentralisation 
was launched in January 2001, which gave District officials increased powers 
to make land use decisions. Civil society organisations sprang forth and 
rapidly filled the institutional space provided by an uncertain bureaucracy, a 
free press, and Indonesians’ yearning for democracy after many years of 
corrupt autocratic rule by the central State. The regime of President Megawati 
following President Abdurrahman Wahid downfall in July 2001 has restored 
macro-economic confidence. Growth has been a steady 4 to 4.5 % annually 
since 2001 and a (slow) start has been made at reforming the bureaucracy 
and the judicial and security services. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the relative levels of influence of the major political agents 
from 1995 to 2004. The initial locked bi-polar situation where the central state 
and private sector ruled at the expense of all other agents has now been 
replaced by a more balanced distribution of effective (formal) power. The 
period in between was characterised by large and often short-lived swings of 
political influence, which gave local communities and civil society brief 
windows of opportunity. It is during this period of rapid power shifts that DFID 
launched the Multistakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP). Its aim was to 
provide Indonesia’s stakeholder the means of experimenting and negotiating 
fairer and more sustainable forest management arrangements. 
 
                                            
15 Yvan Biot, 2004 
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Figure 1: Relative power-shifts of political agents influencing forest 
management 
 
What are the key outcomes or impacts? 
  
From its official inception in October 2000, the MFP provided financial and 
technical support to over 200 partner initiatives that promoted capacity 
building (in organisational strengthening, technical and participative skills, 
research), action research (on conflict negotiation, community based forest 
management, illegal logging), shared lesson learning (through exchange visits 
and documentation) and advocacy for legal reform. 
 
Thus, numerous examples emerged of better forest management by 
communities and the timber industry, co-management of (forest) landscapes 
through participative land use planning, conflict resolution and the elaboration 
of joint management arrangements between the state, private sector and local 
communities. Partner initiatives also promoted institutional reform of 
government and non-governmental organisations, including the private sector. 
The programme also contributed to international processes on trade, finance 
and donor harmonisation.  
 
The results of an Output to Purpose Review (OPR) conducted in 2003 
concluded that in 3 years, the programme had contributed towards:  
 
•  Increased public awareness of sustainability and equity issues; 
•  Local government adopting and co-funding participative approaches; 
•  Raised voice of forest dependent communities;  
•  Increased civil society capacity to act as service providers; 
•  More coherent national policy on illegal logging and social forestry; 
•  Increased use of accountability mechanisms; 
•  Increased pressure on international trade and finance to withdraw 
support to unsustainable and unfair forest management. 
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What are the ingredients that make the initiative a success?   
 
The process of reform and decentralisation launched after Suharto’s downfall 
provided the political space and mandate for the changes the MFP contributed 
towards. Thus, the first ingredient to MFP’s success has been its ability to 
engage rapidly and effectively with a wide range of often very rapidly evolving 
drivers of change. 
 
This ability was grounded in an intensive ‘drivers of change’ analysis which 
preceded the MFP launch by about 18 months, and which was conducted with 
the main stakeholders. The analysis concluded that there was both a need 
and an opportunity for a programme to support negotiations of new political 
settlements, changed attitudes through wider awareness of problems and 
solutions, consensus building through joint stakeholder research and 
dialogue, demonstration of better forest management including for the poor 
and better information, communication and accountability. 
 
The drivers of change analysis stressed the need for a flexible capability to 
promote promising local initiatives  and  facilitate dialogue  and consensus 
building between forest users and government service delivery, between 
different forest users, within forest user organisations, within government, 
between the executive and wider policy actors and between forest users and 
wider policy actors.  
 
The programme’s use of ‘shared learning’ as a tool for developing horizontal 
and vertical lesson learning contributed towards a very rapid dissemination of 
‘policies that work (locally)’. The programme also supported the creation of 
networks to work for change, and to link with other potential supporters 
(donors, government budget). 
 
The programme’s in-built stakeholder accountability allowed for a responsive 
programme management. The decision to review programme management 
when the central government bureaucracy had regained some of its political 
influence allowed for a renewed focus on ‘upstreaming’ and a higher 
likelihood of policy adoption at the Centre.  
 
The operational independence of the facilitator and management team was 
key to bring all stakeholders on board. The programme’s flexibility to engage 
with different stakeholders and to rearrange its management structure has 
allowed it to adjust to the changing political environment (figure 1).  
 
Intensive interaction by DFID advisers with partners at all levels has been 
important to understand what drives change locally as well as nationally, and 
identify potential entry points for engagement. Delegating programme 
management and facilitation to an independent team has allowed DFID to 
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Are there spin-off benefits that were not originally anticipated?  
  
An attitudes survey conducted in 2002 (Casson, 2003) found that local people 
and local government were perceived by most stakeholders to wield more 
influence than in 2000.  
 
At the time of the OPR, stakeholders requested the institutionalisation of the 
MFP as a platform for ‘difficult’ discussions. This goes well beyond what was 
originally thought of as a time-bound initiative to engage a specific political 
opportunity with a view to attitude change. There exists a real chance that the 
programme will gradually evolve into a National Forestry Programme (NFP) 
as mandated by international agreements on forest sector management. 
 
The principles of multi-stakeholder forest management are now widely 
accepted amongst all stakeholders. Local governments across the country 
have started investing funds from local budgets to co-finance participative 
land use planning exercises. 
 
While the programme’s emphasis was on policy processes for future improved 
policy instruments, the MFP has already witnessed the emergence of 
numerous improved government regulations locally. The national government 
launched a Social Forestry programme which interacted closely with MFP 
partners. The government also signed a bilateral agreement with the UK 
government to promote a reduction in trade of illegally harvested forest 
products. 
 
Donor harmonisation has been complicated by diverging donor agendas in the 
sector, fluctuating political dynamics and by an ineffective bureaucracy at the 
centre. Despite these difficulties, the MFP contributed effectively towards new 
approaches to forest sector support by the WB. A renewed drive for donor 
harmonisation will incorporate lessons learnt from the MFP so far. 
  
Is the MFP able to scale-up?  How is this planned? 
  
The MFP was designed to influence local and national policy by providing 
space and opportunities for stakeholders to get involved directly into policy 
making. Scaling up is achieved through lesson learning from partner 
initiatives. Lessons are shared either horizontally amongst partners (civil 
society and / or government organisations), or vertically from communities to 
civil society and eventually to government. Annual partner meetings constitute 
the main forum for exchange of experiences, while more targeted events 
designed by both the facilitation team and partners themselves concentrate 
on specific areas of policy that are of interest at the time (illegal logging, land 
use planning, poverty etc.).  
 
Following the OPR, a scheme was designed for greater participation of the 
forestry bureaucracy in programme management, with a special emphasis on 
the MFP’s ‘shared learning’ activities. A programme of learning from the field 
was launched in July 2004, aimed specifically at Department of Forestry 
officials.  
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So far, the programme has been very successful at influencing local 
government policy and legislation on community based forest management. 
Several local assemblies have proposed to co-fund MFP partner initiatives to 
roll those policies out. At the national level, programme partners have been 
very influential in the development of the National Social Forestry Programme 
which sets out the conditions for greater participation by local communities in 
decision making and profit sharing. The programme has enabled programme 
partners to feed forestry – poverty concerns into the PRSP and to lobby 
parliament on the inclusion of forest related crime as a predicate offence in 
money laundering legislation. The Government’s successful lobby in 
international forums to add Ramin, a valuable timber species, in appendix 3 
(2002) and 2 (2004) of the Convention on the International Trade of 
Endangered Species (CITES) is a direct result of MFP partner advocacy.  
 
What aid instrument is used to support implementation? 
 
The MFP is implemented under a Government-to-Government agreement 
between the governments of Indonesia and the UK. The Planning Agency of 
the Department of Forestry is the implementing agency for Indonesia. It was 
agreed that programme management during the first year would be vested in 
an independent team of facilitators, and that an arrangement would then be 
sought to include programme partners into management. This was eventually 
achieved through an agreement with the Department of Forestry in February 
2004. 
 
Programme implementation is through partnerships with Indonesian 
stakeholders, who are identified by facilitators in the field. The MFP facilitators 
help partners design initiatives that are then submitted to a partnership 
appraisal committee. Once approved, initiatives receive funds directly from 
the UK using DFID’s Accountable Grants scheme. A simple monitoring and 
evaluation scheme is then set in motion to ensure that partners learn from 
experience and that their lessons are shared with others. A team in Jakarta 
ensures that financial training is provided and independent audits are carried 
out to ensure that proper financial management was applied.  
 
The MFP management and facilitation team consists of 2 DFID and 4 Ministry 
of Forestry staff, with support from a team of 20 facilitators and 
administrators.  The UK and Indonesia co-directors report back to their 
respective line agencies. A Steering Committee meets twice a year to 
consider strategic decisions. A partners meeting is held once every 18 
months to share lessons learnt, and receive and evaluate the management 
and facilitation team report. A stakeholder committee meets twice a year to 
monitor the programme management and facilitation team on behalf of 
programme partners, and to bring issues raised by programme partners to the 
attention of programme management and the Steering Committee. 
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How much has been spent under the programme? 
 
The programme is due to run until the end of December 2006, by which time it 
is expected that it will have spent its total design and implementation budget 
of £ 25 million. Two thirds of the funds allocated to partnerships had been 
allocated by the end of 2003. The table below summarises the expected 
spends at the end of the programme. 
 
 
Budget item  £  % 
Personnel - DFID  1,350,000  5 
Personnel - non DFID  3,493,150  14 
Consultancies 628,000  2 
Office running costs  286,075  1 
M&E 958,553  4 
Partnerships 18,456,782 73 
Total 25,172,560  
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III  Improving the Lives of the Poor 
 





The social marketing of Insecticide Treated Bednets (ITNs) began in January 
2002 with a budget of £ 17,800 for 5 years.  Population Services International 
(PSI) implements the project through an accountable grant. The purpose of 
the project is to increase the use of ITNs among pregnant women and 
children under 5. The goal is to reduce morbidity and mortality from malaria 
and contribute to achieving the MDGs. The outputs are: increased availability 
of ITNs and retreatments nationwide; increased informed demand for ITNs 
and retreatments; increased knowledge on malaria, treatment and prevention.  
The project was expected to sell 2.3 million ITNs and 1.5 million retreatment 
over 5 years using Lengler formula this was expected to save 40,000 child 
lives.  
 
The principle of social marketing is that it uses the private sector marketing 
practices to sell public goods and increase knowledge and awareness. It 
creates demand for the product, lowers the prices through encouraging 
involvement of the commercial sector in the supply chain and can eventually 
create a sustainable market at least in urban areas.  
 
The benefits of ITNs are universally acknowledged. They have been found to 
be effective in protecting against malaria, reducing childhood mortality by an 
average of 18% in malaria areas.   However retreatment is crucial to optimise 
the impact, which is why the registration of two Long Lasting Nets is a 
welcome advance in the prevention of malaria. 
  
The project was approved during a time when relationships with the 
Government of Kenya were poor and using social marketing was seen an 
effective way of increasing the coverage of a public good without subsidising a 
non reforming government.  The social marketing approach also supported 
the national malaria strategy without putting extra pressure on an already over 
stretched health system. The MOH at that time were requesting funds to 
distribute free ITNs; in a climate of political patronage, as in Kenyan, there 




The social marketing project used existing distribution networks in urban 
areas but in rural areas it was also necessary to set up a network of kiosks 
that would sell ITNs, condoms as well as other products. Over the first year of 
operation sales targets were exceeded with total sales of 1.38 million 38% 
above target but it was acknowledged that urban sales had been 
disproportionally higher than sales in rural areas and that the rural targets 
were unlikely to be met.  The uptake was lower in rural areas partly due to 
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lower awareness of the benefits and lack of access to retail outlets, but also to 
the low purchasing power of the majority of rural people. An Output to 
Purpose review (OPR) was carried out in January 2005 and it recommended 
that a change of strategy was required if coverage of ITN s in rural areas was 
to increase and achieve a 40% coverage of children sleeping under a net.  
 
The recommendations were accepted and a submission was made to the 
Secretary of State for an additional £10 million. This was approved in June. 
The following strategy is now being implemented.  
 
The price of ITNs in rural areas has been reduced from 200ksh ( $2.5) to 
100ksh ( $1.25)  but in urban areas the price of an ITN will remain at 300ksh. 
 
The project is now focusing its sales through Mother and Child Health (MCH) 
clinics in rural areas and urban slums where an ITN will be sold for 50Ksh. 
  
Once Long Lasting Nets have been registered in Kenya they will be sold 
through the MCH clinics at 50Ksh once production of LLNs has increased they 
will also be sold through the rural kiosks. 
 
Sales targets have been revised and in 5 years the project expects to have 
sold over 7.2 million nets and saved 115,000 child lives resulting in an overall 
reduction in under 5 mortality in Kenya of 10% in malaria areas. 
 




It was not possible to get adequate or quick coverage of women and children 
in rural areas using the existing rural marketing / distribution systems.  In 
Malawi PSI piloted and then scaled up a system of sales through the MCH 
clinics. This model is now being used in Kenya and PSI will minimise the 
burden on the clinic staff by setting up a simple accountable system to monitor 
sales and revenue.  The incentive for staff is that each clinic will be allowed to 
keep 20Ksh per ITN sold.  Paradoxically attendance at MCH clinic is relatively 
good throughout most of the country and so provides access to women and 
children; using the clinics allows better access to vulnerable groups and 
permits better targeting of a subsidised commodity than through the retail 
distribution system. However, significant scale up will be dependant on a 
functioning health system, particularly MCH services but it is expected that 
sales through the kiosks will also increase due to the reduction in price. The 
project will monitor the sales in the MCH clinics and Kiosks to see how the 
different methods compare. 
  
Targeting the Poor. 
 
MCH clinics serve the most vulnerable but not the poorest.  The sale of a 
highly subsidised ITN in the MCH clinic is likely to increase the utilisation of 
the MCH clinic by those not normally attending and thereby increase the 
coverage of essential preventive services such as immunisation and antenatal 
This working paper is intended to stimulate public discussion. It is not necessarily DFID or 
UK Government policy 
36Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: 10 DFID Case Studies 
care. This will be an added bonus to the project and help achieve the health 
related MDGs.  WHO/ UNICEF are advocating for free ITNs to be given out 
during measles campaigns but this method again will target the vulnerable 
and not necessarily the poorest.  DFID has repeatedly offered to pilot different 
methods of reaching the poor however there seems to be a resistance to 
piloting in a belief that the Global Fund will provide funds for free ITNs to be 
delivered through immunisation campaigns. There seems to be a lack of 
recognition that distribution through MCH clinics or immunisation campaigns 
targets the vulnerable who are not always the poorest. Attendance at MCH 
clinics is not 100% and generally those who do not attend are likely to be the 
poorest.  Although targeting through the MCH will rapidly increase coverage of 
vulnerable women and children it is important that we continue to seek 





The social marketing approach can be used to deliver public health goods 
such as ITNs, condoms and contraceptives independent of the health system. 
The greatest impact, however, will be seen in urban areas where extensive 
retail distribution systems exist.  The social marketing approach alone will only 
achieve  limited coverage in rural areas due the lack of extensive retail 
distribution systems. For the greatest impact and in order to reach the 
vulnerable and the poor, a combination of approaches will be required, some 
of which will be dependant on a functioning health systems either managed by 
the Government or NGOs.  Using MCH clinics, as part of a comprehensive 
approach to sell subsidised ITNs is clearly the option of choice, where such 
clinics exist and mothers are attending, whilst at the same time making all 
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When SILSEP began in the middle of 1999, Sierra Leone (SL) had 
experienced nearly a decade of unstable, corrupt, military rule coupled with 
the deprivations of a savage resistance movement – the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) that had occupied between a half and two-thirds of the country 
from the early 90s.  What amounted to a civil war had climaxed in January 
1999 with the invasion of Freetown by the RUF which was only repulsed by 
the West African, Nigerian-led and dominated Peace-keeping Force – 
ECOMOG - through desperate hand-to-hand, street-to-street fighting which 
had resulted in many casualties and massive damage to property.   
 
Understandably in this context, the apparatus of the State and the whole 
pattern of governance had almost collapsed.  The Government elected in 
February 1996 had been driven to take refuge in Conakry in Guinea between 
May 1997 and March 1998 by a military coup (“The Junta”).  Two-thirds of the 
population had either become internally displaced or fled as refugees to 
neighbouring countries.  The Rule of Law, writ of the police and of basic 
government services provision was confined to a few major towns in the 
provinces and to the Western Area around Freetown.  
 
Awareness that internal security had to become a major priority focus of 
support began to grow in 1998 and was catalysed by the events of early 1999.  
SILSEP was designed in late 1998 and concurrently, a senior British General 
undertook a review of SL security and evolved a military assistance 
programme focused on the re-recruitment, re-training and strengthening of the 
SL Armed Forces.  At the same time, their awareness of the importance of 
security was shared by the UN.  UNOMSIL took shape in 1999 and eventually 
became the much larger and more strongly mandated UNAMSIL in 2000 after 
the crisis of May 2000 when the RUF attacked UNOMSIL and drove it back 
towards Freetown – a situation that was only stabilised by the intervention of 
the British Rapid Reaction Force.   
 
 
Security Sector Reform  
 
The following factors faced policy makers in 1999.  
 
(i)    The total lack of political and civil service control over the Armed 
Forces.  There was a Ministry of Defence but in its own assessment, it acted 
only as a postbox between the Head of State and the Army high command in 
the main barracks.  Since the Head of State was also for long periods the 
Chief of Defence staff, negotiations of military budgets, equipment orders and 
recruitment expansion were not severely questioned.  The Ministry of Finance 
was simply instructed to make the funds available and much expenditure was 
off-budget and unrecorded. 
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(ii)    Indiscipline and poor training in effectiveness were endemic in the 
Armed Forces.  Soldiers exercised complete impunity before the law and 
civilians were terrified of them in all contexts. 
 
 
(iii)   There was no overall security strategy or military doctrine shaping the 
size, deployment and role of the Armed Forces or their relationships with other 
agencies such as the police, immigration services and customs. 
 
(iv)    De facto, the Armed Forces roamed at will, robbing the local 
population, attacking them and yet providing no effective defence against the 
RUF.  There was deep suspicion of what were called “sobels” – soldiers by 
day, rebels by night. 
 
 
(v)   Desperation amongst the local population had revived the local tribal 
secret societies/militias and brought them together into the “Civil Defence 
Forces” that were acting as an alternative army and – at one time – had their 
headquarters in the Ministry of Defence which wasn’t doing anything much 





SILSEP was designed with 3 major objectives: 
 
(i)   to build up the SL Ministry of Defence (MoD): 
•  to direct, manage and hold the Armed Forces to account; 
•  to relate effectively and efficiently to the rest of GoSL as regards 
matters of the security sector (for example, budgeting with the MoF; 
logistics/barracks etc with the Ministry of Works); 
•  and also gradually to strengthen the overall systems and relate to the 
security sector in the rest of GoSL:  principally the Ministry of Finance, 
but also other functions of government. 
 
 
(ii)    to create effective capacity in the embryonic but moribund Office of 
National Security (ONS) under the National Security Co-ordinator: 
•  to make it capable of addressing and creating an overall security sector 
strategy, completing an internal and external threat analysis and 
developing from that;  
•  to be able to undertake detailed National Defence and Security Policy 
planning; 
•  to be able to handle the integration and co-ordination of the various 
security services of the state – particularly the police, but also the 
intelligence services, immigration and the local security apparatus 
represented by the Chiefs and their retainers. 
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(iii)   (An objective which was added within the first six months of SILSEP’s 
existence).  To re-build the effectiveness of the SL Intelligence Service – the 
Central Intelligence Security Unit (CISU): 
•  re-establishing and as far as possible de-politicising its leadership and 
control structure; 
•  changing in some cases its staffing, expanding its numbers and 
properly training the intelligence operatives; 
•  creating the capacity to make informed influential intelligence 




Inputs and Progress  
 
SILSEP provided experienced external advisors (two, then three in the MoD; 
one growing to two in the ONS/CISU), training opportunities for SL staff, new 
manuals and procedures, particular emphasis on budget preparation and 
presentation and then significant amounts of office equipment and the 
rehabilitation of an old hotel in Freetown as the new MoD Headquarters.   
These, it should be emphasised, were complemented by parallel 
developments with the Armed Forces themselves from 2000 onwards.  An 
international but essentially British military training team (IMATT) tackled the 
re-training of officers and men in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces 
(RSLAF – deliberately renamed) and the UK also supplied substantial 
amounts of military equipment through the Africa Conflict Pool mechanism.   
 
Progress has been significant but objectives have by no means been 
achieved as yet: 
 
(i)   The MoD has been expanded, its role clarified and consolidated and it 
has taken over the functions of budgeting and control to a large extent.  A 
‘dual hierarchy’ on the UK MoD model has been created with the military top 
hierarchy and the civil service top officials co-located together in the new MoD 
Headquarters.  The Minister of Defence (actually the Deputy Minister as the 
President is the Minister) and the Permanent Secretary/Director-General are 
meant to be in the ascendant and are in most situations.  But there is still the 
deeply-felt suspicion and fear of the military amongst civilians, sometimes 
shared by the officials of the MoD.  And the military hierarchy are still not 
accustomed to having to explain and justify their decisions and preferences. 
 
(ii)   Budgeting for the military has been taken over by the Ministry, with 
large amounts of UK input, and now follows the budget cycle controlled by the 
MoF.  But there are still problems in relationships due to the huge amounts of 
money that the military require to fund their operations. 
 
(iii)   Civilian staffing of the MoD has improved in capacity, but still faces the 
problem of impermanence of tenure as civil servants are administrative 
officers and therefore subject to transfer especially on promotion.  Significant 
numbers of British Army officers have occupied executive positions in the 
MoD on a temporary basis and this has proved a difficult problem in 
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relationships and in their replacement – which is now going ahead rapidly. 
 




Turning to the ONS/CISU, the record is of greater success:   
 
(i) The Intelligence Service is being re-built successfully with new recruitment 
and training and with significant inputs into national decision-making.  A 
professional recruitment policy was established, that weeded out the potential 
political appointees. 
 
(ii) The Central Intelligence and Security Unit is professionally trained, and is 
able to provide professionally sourced intelligence to the Sierra Leone 
government on key issues that affect national security.  A protective security 
manual will come into use shortly. 
 
(iii) A regional security system has been established, based on community 
participation in provincial and district security committees.  These committees 
bring together the Police, Army and local government officials as well as 
members of the community.  They are the primary mechanism for 
coordinating responses to a riot or natural disaster.  They also report back to 
Freetown, and manage cross (district) border issues 
 
(iv) The ONS has drafted a Security Sector Review.  This identifies the 
security needs of Sierra Leone based upon the analysis of the key threats it 
faces.  The review will feed into the Security Pillar of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Programme.  It is still in the final draft stage and, once agreed by the 
National Security Council, will have wide-ranging implications for the structure 
of the security sector. 
 
(v) The National Security Coordinator now oversees the entire security sector 
budget to ensure that the needs of different agencies are considered against 
each other. 
 
Nonetheless, in all 3 objectives of SILSEP, achievements while considerable 
are still fragile.  There is still a question mark over whether the RSLAF have 
given up their tradition of taking political power.  Instability in neighbouring 
countries could spread back into SL.  Frustration at the lack of any ‘peace 
dividend’ and economic and social benefits in the Provinces could see the re-
emergence of the RUF or its successor.  Ministers have agreed that UK 
support should continue for the foreseeable future.  This is recognised in the 
Ten-Year Memorandum of Understanding that now governs the UK’s aid 




There are a considerable number, some through fairly traumatic experience: 
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(i)   The first is the need for design to be extremely flexible.  The objective 
of reforming and strengthening the intelligence services was not included in 
the initial design but added after six months in response to urgent needs.  The 
second was a willingness to rely on expatriate inputs in de facto executive 
positions.  In Sierra Leone’s post-conflict context, there has been no 
alternative.  This may remain the case for some time to come. 
 
(ii)   A second lesson has been the need for ‘joined-up’ approaches:  first 
within Whitehall and particularly in linking DFID and MoD; and then in Sierra 
Leone with a dual effort to reform the Armed Forces and strengthen the 
civilian and political control apparatus.  Whitehall coordination has been in the 
context of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool.  To these should be added, the 
overall security impact of the very large UNAMSIL force that has kept the 
peace in SL in recent years and secured the demobilisation of the RUF and 
CDF.  Without these ‘physical’ interventions into the security sector, the 
SILSEP agenda would have been very difficult if not impossible to achieve.  
Sierra Leone has yet to experience the performance of these new structures 
in the absence of the UN peacekeepers.  This will occur in 2005, and will be a 
key moment. 
 
(iii)   A third lesson is the need to provide a range of inputs and not confine 
support to technical assistance.  Physical equipment is as important 
psychologically as it is in real use.  Operational expenses have in some cases 
to be considered in a desperate post-conflict situation. 
 
(iv)    Then there is the question of the police/armed forces balance in 
matters of internal security and border control.  The UK has also supported a 
comparatively very large police re-development programme in conjunction 
with the Commonwealth to a small extent.  The growing strength of the SLP 
has been instrumental in the redefinition of the role of the RSLAF and the 
eventual replacement of the Armed Forces by the Police in matters of internal 
security.  It is also to the Police that the system is looking for security rather 
than the RSLAF once UNAMSIL withdraws.  The UK’s role in RSLAF, 
intelligence, and police reform has given us exceptional influence in security 
sector reform, and influencing of policy. It has also tied us into a major and 
long-term commitment. 
 
(v)   The context for SILSEP is therefore a complex and wide-ranging one.  
It takes its place amongst a range of security sector-focused programmes, 
some of which are massively larger than its own budget.  But it appears that 
this comprehensive, multi-faceted approach is essential in an area as complex 
and difficult as the Security Sector. 
 
(vi)    Calibre and attitudes of personnel have been a secondary but 
extremely influential factor.  The ability of British military officers to act as 
mentors and guides to SL counterparts especially in the MoD has been mixed 
but where successful, absolutely vital in developing the MoD capacity.  There 
is sometimes a difficulty with the military psychology of ‘can do’, compared 
with the aid ideology of encouraging local citizens to do it.  The high quality of 
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the National Security Coordinator and the Director General of CISU has 
added greatly to the success of these organisations. 
 
(vii)   The MoD capacity development cannot really be separated from the 
overall strengthening of the civil service which is proving a very hard nut to 
crack.  The MoD is subject to civil service rules in the SL system and can only 
progress and reform itself within that overall context. 
 
Governance Context 
SILSEP has been an integral part of a wide-ranging DFID governance reform 
programme, which also includes measures to combat corruption, and support 
to decentralisation, judicial reform, the disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration (DDR) programme and public administration and public financial 
reform.  A policy decision was taken to focus on governance and security 
issues, in the light of the extreme deterioration in these sectors over the post-




 The portion of SILSEP funds devoted to the ONS/CISU has recently doubled.  
This has enabled the ONS to set up Provincial and District Security 
Committees.  This increase in funds followed a request from the National 
Security Co-ordinator and an appraisal mission during which the extra funds 
were agreed.  Our support has been decisive in helping the ONS to establish 





One potentially difficult lesson for the future is the comparatively very large 
cost of successful reform of the SL Security Sector.  This is not because of the 
SILSEP budget itself which has remained relatively modest (£750,000 
annually, recently increased to £1.5m) but because of the comparatively very 
large expenditure (for a small country of between 4-5 million population) in 
other SS programmes: £25m over four years for the Police, £51m over the 
last 3 years for IMATT, and UK contributions to UNAMSIL of £81.7m over the 
last 3 years. 
 
Cost is perhaps the hardest lesson to learn.  Effective SSR is not only multi-
faceted but also comparatively, extremely expensive.  But it is essential to 
overall improvements in Governance and eventual re-establishment of 
economic and social development in post-conflict situations.   
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IV  Aid Instruments and Scaling Up 
 






Afghanistan’s reconstruction has presented extraordinary challenges for the 
people and government of Afghanistan, and for the international community. 
The country was devastated by more than two decades of conflict, destruction 
of physical and human resources and the erosion of institutions and social 
capital. The challenge of Afghanistan called for an unprecedented response 
form the international community. The initial response was to pledge $4.5 
billion for the first two and a half years of the transitional government. One of 
the critical determinants of success was the need for effective coordination of 
the reconstruction process under the leadership of the Government of 
Afghanistan (GoA).  
 
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) provides a coordinated 
way  for donors to help the GoA. Funded by donor countries, and jointly 
managed by international aid agencies, the ARTF supports the recurrent and 
capital costs of the Government and finances priority projects and programs to 
rebuild Afghanistan and facilitate the return of skilled expatriate Afghans to the 
country.  The ARTF promotes a more equitable distribution of international 
assistance and emphasises ownership and leadership by the government. It 
supports a Government-proposed program of investments prioritised from 
within the national budget. The main advantages of the ARTF have been 
shown to be: 
•  promotion of transparency and accountability of reconstruction 
assistance; 
•  helping to reinforce the national budget in order to align the 
reconstruction program with national objectives; 
•  reducing the burden on limited government capacity, while promoting 
capacity building over time; and 
•  helping to fund the recurrent budgetary expenditures required for the 
government to function effectively. 
The ARTF has contributed significantly to the key obstacles of insecurity, poor 
governance, lack of transparency as well as implementation capacity. It has 
ultimately led to increased transparency and accountability in the use of 
government revenue and donor funds, while increasing the planning capacity 
of the government providing a harmonized focal point for donor finance.  
 
 
                                            
18 Andrew Clark, Economist, DFID Afghanistan programme  
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Key Outcomes and Impacts 
 
The ARTF has been critical in meeting essential short-term recurrent, 
operating and maintenance cost requirements of key government institutions 
and buildings and financing bulk purchases of essential equipment. ARTF 
support enabled payment of monthly salaries to more than 220,000 civil 
servants—over half of whom are outside of Kabul. The ARTF has assisted the 
Government in establishing sound fiduciary practices in public finances and 
supporting good governance. The ARTF also strengthens the presence of the 
central Government across Afghanistan, through the funding of salaries and 
capital costs in the provinces as well as Kabul and has assisted in the building 
of a democratic state. 
 
There has been notable success in leveraging a more effective and efficient 
allocation of the government budget with increased non-salary expenditure 
and investment expenditure. Contributions to the ARTF have increased 
dramatically from $185 million in 2002/03 to $286 million in 2003/04. £395 
million has been committed for 2004/05. It has become the preferred funding 
mechanism for almost all donors in Afghanistan. 
 
The ARTF has had four main outcomes: (1) the promotion of transparency 
and accountability of reconstruction assistance; (2) reinforcing the national 
budget as the vehicle for promoting alignment of the reconstruction program 
with national objectives, increasing governance capacity to plan the 
development objectives and priorities of the Government of Afghanistan; (3) 
reduction of the burden on limited government capacity at the outset, while 
promoting capacity building over time; and  (4) as a suitable instrument to help 
fund the essential recurrent budgetary expenditures required for the 
government to function effectively. Beyond these four main outcomes the 
ARTF also provided critical donor assistance in the face of large 
reconstruction and recurrent expenditure needs, due to the almost non-
existent revenue base. Significant external funding for budgetary support was 
required during the transitional period until domestic revenues started to 
increase and began to cover recurrent budgetary expenditures.  
 
Transparency and Accountability: There has been full openness and 
transparency in the ARTF process. There is a clear separation between the 
policy/allocational aspects of ARTF operations and the fiduciary/administrative 
responsibility. It has a three-tier governance structure. The Government of 
Afghanistan, although not part of the formal governance structure of the 
ARTF, plays an integral role in reviewing proposals for ARTF funding and 
submitting those proposals that it considers are consistent with national 
priorities as embodied in the budget. The Management Committee of the 
ARTF exercises collective responsibilities for oversight activities of the ARTF. 
Donors review performance and provide strategic guidance to the ARTF and 
receive quarterly reports and participate in quarterly meetings. In addition, an 
annual meeting of all contributing donors, joined by the GoA, reviews the 
previous years performance and overall priorities and strategic direction. The 
ARTF, during the transitional period, has allowed the GoA to build up a track 
record in terms of effectively functioning financial management and 
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accountability mechanisms. The ARTF Monitoring Agent monitors the GoA’s 
procurement of goods, works and services and monitor expenditures out of 
the ARTF to ensure that funds are disbursed in accordance with the 
acceptable financial and auditing standards.  
 
Reinforcing national budget: The ARTF provides partial support for an agreed 
GoA budget, which reflects in a transparent manner a comprehensive GoA 
program of activities. This involves a prior elaboration of a comprehensive 
program of recurrent expenditures and investments and its incorporation into 
a budget – even initially only a rudimentary one that is consistent with the 
broader macroeconomic and fiscal framework. The ARTF helps ensure the 
overall framework and broad priorities of the budget are discussed, agreed 
and supported by the donor community. Once the budget is agreed, the GoA 
is responsible for implementing the budget, and for monitoring the use and 
effectiveness of budget funds. The ARTF has ensured that the government 
reports regularly to the public and donors on actual expenditures in the 
budget. Although the ARTF finances only a portion of the overall 
reconstruction program, it is closely integrated into the government budget 
and associated reconstruction and development programs, as well as the 
broader reconstruction framework. 
 
Building Government Capacity: The Government has committed to use ARTF 
funding as it simplifies management and oversight of donor resources by 
coordinating financial assistance. The ARTF has be critical in providing the 
GoA the time and space to build capacity in the budget process as well as 
increase domestic revenue efforts whilst providing a focal point for donor 
contributions, reducing the burden on the GoA to manage and account for 
donor funds. There has been genuine donor coordination and an unusual 
degree of partnership between donors and agencies, and a willingness of all 
donors and agencies to cooperate in the implementation of the GoA’s broad 
development objectives and priorities. The ARTF has provided partial support 
for an agreed GoA budget, which reflects in a transparent manner a 
comprehensive GoA program of activities. This implies the prior elaboration of 
such a comprehensive program has helped the GoA in building their capacity 
to plan and implement a comprehensive program of recurrent and investment 
expenditures. 
 
Recurrent Budget and Government Revenue: The ARTF supports salaries of 
about 220 000 civil servants each month, over half of whom are outside of 
Kabul. In addition, the ARTF supports operating and maintenance costs of key 
government buildings and finances the bulk purchases of essential 
equipment. The ARTF has been the major contributor to recurrent 
expenditures. Government revenues continue to contribute to only 40% of 
government expenditures. In the face of large reconstruction and recurrent 
expenditure needs, Afghanistan at present has an insignificant domestic 
revenue base. The ARTF has been the only source of funds to cover critical 
short-term expenditures, especially the workings of government and critically 
at the provincial and district level. Although revenues have been increased 
over time, substantial external funding for budgetary support has been 
required during the transitional period. This will be the case until domestic 
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revenue covers a large proportion of core recurrent budgetary expenditures. 
In the absence of a comprehensive budget support mechanism the ARTF has 
provided a critical source of short-term emergency assistance. In addition, it 
has provided the GoA the freedom to pursue more medium-term strategic 
planning for example in customs and tax reform, thus creating a credible base 
for medium to long-term revenue planning.   
 
Ingredients and design features contributing to its success 
 
The ARTF has become the main instrument for support to the Government’s 
recurrent expenditures – funding such necessary costs as the salaries of 
teachers and health workers. The ARTF, while supporting the Government’s 
recurrent costs, is also being used increasingly as a mechanism to fund 
priority investments in the Government’s reconstruction program. The ARTF 
was designed as a mechanism for coordinating funding of reconstruction 
activities in line with agreed priorities of the Government. This design aspect 
has been one of the key factors why the ARTF has become the key funding 
mechanism for donors. 
 
The governance structure of the ARTF has been a critical component in its 
success. Donor interventions in fragile states are inherently risky from a 
financial management perspective. Given the ARTF is overseen by a 
Management Committee who is responsible for reviewing progress and 
making key management decisions, and the fact that there is an external 
‘Monitoring Agent’ to ensure fiduciary management, this has increased donor 
confidence and encouraged significant levels of funding.  
 
The separation of recurrent and capital costs from investment projects through 
‘ARTF windows’, have allowed donors to allocate their funds through the 
‘donor preferences’ mechanism to permit donors to focus on their relative 
preferences, whilst bringing a focal point and coordination mechanism for 
donor funding that follows GoA priorities.  
 
Given the obstacles of poor governance and lack of implementation capacity 
in the GoA, the ARTF through investment projects and programs has 
addressed the need for short-term impact at the local and district level. The 
investment ‘window’ has financed pre-feasibility studies and activities in 
agriculture, infrastructure, micro-finance and the social sectors. This has 
helped to address short-term sectoral needs and high priority projects and 
programs identified by the GoA. These activities have been in the form of 
sector-wide programs or stand-alone investment projects with a common 
development objective. These activities have been placed within the 
framework of the GoA budget and the ARTF has been able to absorb and 
facilitate finance from numerous sources, including both bilateral and 
multilateral donors.   
 
Scale up of intervention 
 
The scale up of donor activity around the ARTF has been dramatic. Donor 
contributions have increased form $185 million in 2002/03 to $286 million in 
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2003/04. Donor pledges so far in 2004/05 have amounted to $395 million. 
This represents a significant scale up of activities as government capacity to 
plan and implement government priority programs has increased. This has 
been done whilst addressing critical short terms needs with respect to 
government recurrent costs. DFID itself has increased its allocation to the 
ARTF from £10 million to total of £80 million over the first two years of 
operation. As the remit of the GoA has expanded across Afghanistan the 
ARTF has allowed a smooth transition to a higher level of donor finance, 
through the recurrent cost window. In addition, as the planning and absorptive 
capacities of investment programs have increased there has been a scale up 
of donor finance through the investment window of the ARTF. 
 
Implementation mechanisms, including financing, aid instruments and 
implementation 
 
The recurrent component of the ARTF provides finance direct to the 
government’s budget to reimburse the GoA for its expenditures on recurrent 
and capital costs. In the investment component, which finances 10 active 
investment projects, funds are transferred to the implementing agents of the 
respective investment projects. The fiduciary arrangements for the investment 
and program component are carried out in accordance with normal World 
Bank procedures. Recipients of investment and program funds under sub-
grant agreements are required to maintain appropriate financial management 
systems. The Monitoring Agent also assesses the development impact 
achieved by the respective reconstruction activities. 
 
Beyond the recurrent and capital cost component of the ARTF it also provides 
focus to government priority investment programs, ensuring development 
objectives, beyond simply the workings of government, are addressed. The 
ARTF also permits donors to earmark preferences based on their strategic 
preferences. Implicitly the ARTF is the preferred modality for financing 
investment projects because it entrenches good management practices within 
the government and line ministries. These include the requirement to prepare 
projects to international standards, whilst meeting international standards for 
procurement and financial management. ARTF financing reduces the number 
of project accounts to be managed and thus streamlines the financial 
reporting and audit requirements. The World Bank provides fiduciary oversight 
and the management committee of the ARTF governs project approval. 
 
The Monitoring Agent undertakes the financial management of recurrent and 
capital cost component. This will be the case until the GoA has built up a track 
record of financial management and accountability mechanisms, by which 
stage the ARTF will systematically phase out funding both recurrent and 
investment costs. This qualified and experienced independent Monitoring 
Agent is contracted by the ARTF Administrator to monitor and review 
disbursements, payments, accounting, and reporting activities to be financed 
by the ARTF.  
 
Through these arrangements, delivery and accountability systems have been 
markedly strengthened and mainstreamed nationally, both on recurrent and 
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operating costs as well as investment type programs. Under the ARTF the 
GoA has developed nationwide fund-flow, audit, procurement and monitoring 
mechanisms. The monitoring agent oversees the GoA’s procurement of 
goods, works and services and monitors the expenditures out of the ARTF to 
ensure funds are disbursed only for the purposes for which they have been 
provided.  
 
Until now the World Bank and Monitoring Agent have agreed that the 
procurement arrangements and acceptable financial and auditing standards 
have been met and are in accordance with procedures and standards of the 
World Bank and consistent with their requirements. DFID is currently funding 
an external evaluation of the ARTF. The overall objective of the review is to 
evaluate the effectiveness and impact of ARTF operations over the past two 
years. The assessment will be made in terms of the relevance, impact, 
effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness and the sustainable benefits of the 
ARTF.  
 
Spend under the programme 
 
To date the ARTF has received approximately $600 million from 24 donors, 
with an additional $160 million pledged for the rest of the financial year (until 
March 2005). Donor funds provided through the ARTF have doubled in the 
first two years of ARTF operations and continue to increase. Government 
revenues have increased during this period, increasing from $132 million to 
$250 million (projected) this year. The ARTF continues to cover the recurrent 
and operating cost gap as well as the bulk of funding for investment programs.   
 
DFID remains the largest contributor to the ARTF with total contribution 
amounting to $160 million. This has encouraged other donors to continue to 
increase their allocation of funds to the ARTF.  Given the ARTF remains a 
transitional funding mechanism its ultimate success will be based on the 
systematic phasing out of the Trust Fund mechanism and the long-term 
sustainable benefits that have accrued. 
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The Social Fund for Development in Yemen provides a powerful illustration 
that donor aid can be used effectively in a fragile state. The SFD is successful 
in achieving improved social services delivery, in augmenting and enhancing 
government service delivery systems and in increasing institutional capacity of 
both governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in social 
services delivery.  The approach of the SFD is widely acknowledged as 
innovative and exemplary, and is a progressive force for change in the Yemen 
context.  The SFD has been described as “a formidable actor in terms of 






Poverty in Yemen is pervasive and failing to improve – based on current 
trends it looks unlikely that Yemen will achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals. Yemen is the only low-income country in the Middle East and North 
Africa with social indicators reflecting very low levels of development
21. 
Yemen is facing a nexus of critical challenges – spiralling population growth, 
low human development, prospects of declining government revenues as oil 
reserves start to run out (05 onwards), poor institutional capacity, high levels 
of corruption, a water crisis which will prove increasingly problematic for 
economic growth and domestic consumption – and it is questionable whether 
the Government of Yemen has the political will or the administrative capacity 
to deliver on the core functions needed to address people’s basic needs and 
basic rights. 
 
Yemen has a long history of conflict and civil war that continues to threaten 
sustainable development.   Although general level of security have improved 
since September 2001, it remains difficult to operate in some of the poorest 
areas of the country that have traditionally been outside of central government 
control.  Given the unstable risk environment there are serious constraints on 
donors seeking to respond to the country’s pressing needs.  In contrast the 
SFD has showed a good record in absorbing high levels of donor funding 
which indicates that this can be achieved in other sectors. 
 
In the last few years the Government of Yemen, in cooperation with donors, 
has been involved in a process of institutional reform and financial 
management reform. However the decentralisation process embarked upon in 
the last 4 years looks unlikely to bring about the much-needed institutional 
changes and is facing resistance from those with vested interests.  The slow 
pace of civil service reform means that Social Fund for Development and 
                                            
19 Dominic O’Neill 
 
20  DFID Country Representative, July 04 
21 Yemen is ranked 148 out of 175 countries in the 2003 Human Development index 
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others are likely to be involved in supporting services delivery until at least 
2008 and beyond. 
 
 
Social Fund For Development 
The SFD was established in 1997 as part of a social safety net which 
contributes to poverty alleviation in Yemen by improving living conditions and 
income generation to poor people through three programmes: community 
development, capacity building, and micro credit.   
 
To date the Community Development component (education, water and 
environment, social protection and infrastructure) has accounted for 90% of 
the operational budget as compared to just over 5% on capacity building and 
approx 3% on micro enterprise
22.   Recently the SFD has reconfigured into 5 
main programmes: 
•  Human Resources Development which includes the education sector
23, 
health sector and social protection sector; 
•  Cultural Heritage 
•  Small and Micro Enterprise Development 
•  Water and Environment which includes Water Harvesting, Irrigation, 
Waste Water Management and Solid Waste Management; 
•  Civil Society and Local Authority, which includes support to NGOs and 
co-operatives, CBOs, and the Local Authority. 
 
The SFD was initiated with the support of a few people in the Government of 
Yemen in partnership with the World Bank and has recently entered its third 
phase 2004-08.  The considerable success of the SFD in the first two phases 
has led to a substantial scaling-up of the resources and capacity of the SFD 
which now has an indicative total budget of £220 million over the 4 year period 
of phase lll.  Currently the SFD is funded by the World Bank, EU, Dutch, KFW, 
UK, USAID and the Arab Fund - but other donors have expressed interest. 
 
By the end of June O4 the SFD had completed 2,384 projects
24 with a total 
investment of $144,231,019 reaching nearly 7.5million beneficiaries with a 
further 2.7 million indirect beneficiaries.  As such a wide range of projects 
have been undertaken by SFD during the first 7 years of operation, SFD has 
built up a wealth of experience and understanding of how to work effectively in 
a fragile state.  This case study focuses primarily on the achievements of the 
Human Resources Development programme, including progress made on 
cross cutting issues and related capacity building initiatives. In particular, 
reviewing why the SFD has been successful and the lessons learnt, as well as 
outlining the challenges facing the SFD during phase III and beyond. 
 
 
                                            
22 EC report, April 04 
 
23 within HRD,  the Education Unit is now a stand alone unit with by far the greatest concentration of SFD projects, 
both past and planned 
24 over half of these were education projects 
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SFD Approach – building on experience 
SFD’s approach is innovative and progressive in the context of Yemen.  It is 
characterised by being bottom-up, poverty focused, and demand driven, with 
strong community participation and gender mainstreaming.  In addition SFD 
has developed specific mechanisms to address needs of socially isolated 
areas – via geographical targeting, social targeting and sectoral targeting.   
The SFD targeting mechanisms ensure that most of the funds invested go to 
poor communities but the investments provide advantages to the whole 
community not only the poorest – since everyone benefits from improved 
basic services. 
 
The SFD have demonstrated that the more involved the community are in 
designing and implementing projects, the greater the ownership and 
commitment to managing the infrastructure funded by SFD.  Accordingly SFD 
have recently started piloting a new approach which promotes Community 
Contracting for projects – in the water sector SFD have that the advantages of 
community contracting far outweigh the disadvantages.  The SFD has also 
embarked upon piloting an Integrated Community Development Program 
which moves the SFD beyond micro projects and involves it in supporting a 
range of interventions aimed at achieving a cumulative impact in designated 
communities. 
 
SFD have found that providing different models and influencing by example is 
the best way to achieve positive outcomes in respect of line ministries.  SFD’s 
targeting and distribution methodology could serve as a model not only for 
Social Safety Net (SSN) partners but also for district and governorate councils 
in development planning.  It has been widely recognised that the SFD has a 
crucial role to play in supporting the decentralisation process in Yemen since 
local councils have limited capacity to prepare annual plans in a strategic, 
participatory and coordinated way.  Similarly the FD has vital experience to 
contribute to the national Poverty Reduction Strategy and needs to be more 
clearly part of this planning process. 
 
 
SFD Project Impact 
Significant progress in the provision of education makes this a flagship 
programme of the SFD. Impact has been measured in a number of ways – 
SFD investment has resulted in an increase in enrolment which is particularly 
marked for girls; has resulted in schools being open more regularly, with less 
teacher absences and higher pupils attendance and greater parental 
participation.  Over 1300 education projects have been implemented – 
primarily the SFD contributes to school building, but more recently the SFD 
has started to provide a number of capacity building interventions to selected 
directorates of the Ministry of Education.  The Minister of Education is clear 
about the added value of working in partnership with the SFD.  The Ministry 
have a clear strategy within which SFD can cooperate; the MOE and SFD 
have devised clear areas of responsibility and an agreed division of labour. An 
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added benefit of having multiple providers in the education sector is that it has 
resulted in lower school construction costs. 
 
While the SFD has been successful in building up a close partnership with the 
Ministry of Education, this has not proved so easy with other line ministries 
which tend to regard all sectoral projects and their related resources as falling 
under their planning and management remit. The track record of the SFD with 
working in partnership with the Ministry of Health has been less 
straightforward.  Poor experiences of SFD investing in health projects during 
Phase I and II has led to the SFD being more cautious about building any new 
primary health care units.  Currently SFD will only consider projects which 
complement existing health services. SFD ‘s main support is for the building 
up of health cadres in rural areas, especially female health workers. 
  
However the Ministry or Water and Environment recognise the value of 
drawing from SFD’s experience in water services provision in rural areas.   
Some SFD early failed water projects – led to decision not to undertake any 
projects which require mechanised plant e.g. pumps.  The primary focus of 
the water provision has been new and rehabilitated cisterns and economic 
return for these is usually high, as evidenced by the 6 month – 2year pay back 
period.  In addition to the expected impacts of health and social benefits of 
having better and closer water supplies, the water projects have led to other 
spin-offs such increased girls’ enrolment, greater empowerment and 
confidence within the community to undertake further projects. 
 
The SFD has a widely acclaimed reputation for its expertise and contribution 
to disability work.  The SFD takes a pro-active approach to working with 
special needs groups
25 in its programme of social protection.  Nearly 100 
projects have been undertaken with an investment of $5.7 million. In all of 
these interventions SFD have encouraged a participatory approach, for 
example by encouraging groups with special needs to organise themselves, to 
analyse their situation, devise practical solutions and make their voices heard.  
Notably SFD has had an impact on changing traditional attitudes to disability 
in Yemen. 
 
DFID Support To Yemen 
DFID regards it as strategically important not to abandon fragile states such 
as Yemen – rather there is a need to find different ways of working and to 
support Yemen with the right mix of policies and assistance.  Clearly there are 
huge challenges if Yemen is to be encouraged to meet the MDGs, and DFID 
has carried out a Drivers of Change study as part of understanding better how 
to work effectively in Yemen. 
 
DFID has committed a £12.3m contribution for phase III of the SFD (in 
addition to its £1.6m check contribution for phase II just completed). DFID’s 
support to SFD for phase 3 is unearmarked and in alignment with World Bank 
reporting and monitoring procedures. DFID is encouraging other donors to 
follow this approach to reduce the administrative burden on SFD. In addition 
                                            
25 disabled people, children at risk (orphans, street children), women at risk (women in prisons) and socially 
marginalized (Akhdam, those in psychiatric hospitals,  isolated elderly, returnees living in shanty areas). 
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£300k of the support to SFD has been made available as a flexible assistance 
fund to help SFD carry out long term planning and investigate ways of better 
alignment to sectoral line ministries.    
 
DFID’s aim
26  in supporting the SFD is to improve access of low income 
groups to basic social services, while providing an example of an effective, 
efficient and transparent institutional mechanism for providing social services 
in Yemen.  DFID is keen to influence greater harmonisation between the SFD 
and the Government of Yemen’s mainstream programmes, especially in 
health and education.   
 
A joint DFID and Dutch review mission in April 04 found the SFD to be an 
“efficient and effective organisation delivering well targeted basic services in a 
difficult environment”.   Moreover, despite having the constraints of a fragile 
state, the reviewers concluded that the SFD has proved it can work effectively 
as an agent for change and as a capacity builder in Yemen.   
 
The critical challenge for the SFD in the coming period remains the need to 
build a strategic partnership with the Government of Yemen, through breaking 
down the general reluctance of the line ministries to fully engage with the 
SFD.  This strategic partnership would enable the SFD to maximise its 
potential contribution and develop a policy dialogue on how to mainstream 
social services programmes which benefit the poor in Yemen.  The SFD 
needs to be part of the solution of working towards Yemen being a more 
effective state in delivering good basic services which are the right of its 
people. 
                                            
26 which mirrors the World Bank goal 
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In Burma, the UN-led Joint Programme to tackle HIV/AIDS operates as a de 
facto national plan consistent with the “Three Ones” approach.  The Fund for 
HIV/AIDS in Myanmar has increased the resources available for the 
implementation of the Joint Programme.  These mechanisms have helped to 
co-ordinate implementation efforts, provided a forum for policy dialogue, 
paved the way for Global Fund resources and begun the process of 




Why was this needed? 
 
In 2004, Burma stands on the brink of what may be one of the most serious 
epidemics in Asia. UNAIDS estimates up to 620,000 people infected. The 
spread of infection across the country varies widely by geographical location 
and by population sub group. Of all AIDS cases reported with known mode of 
HIV transmission up until the end of 2003, 65% were due to heterosexual 
contact, 26% to injecting drug use, and 5% to contaminated blood.   Trends in 
official surveillance data since 2001 show increasing rates of infection among 
key sentinel groups: 33.5% in sex workers, 2.2% in new military recruits and 
2.2% in pregnant women (suggesting that the epidemic is already generalised 
in the population). 
 
The national response, although improving recently, is inadequate, both in 
terms of the resources made available and the policies developed to address 
the problem.  Policies and actions by the authorities are a major obstacle in an 
effective response, for example: restrictions on testing; criminalisation of key 
vulnerable groups; and barriers to collection of behaviour sentinel surveillance 
data critical to planning the response.  Levels of stigma and discrimination are 
high, and operational restrictions (e.g. on movement) are a major obstacle.  At 
the time the Joint Programme was developed, the official policy was to deny 
the nature and scale of the problem.  This has changed although much more 
needs to be done to strengthen the response. 
 
Because of its unfavourable policy environment, Burma receives little aid and 
Western countries have placed serious limitations on non-humanitarian donor 
aid to Burma until it fulfils its pledges to introduce genuine political reform.  EU 
countries maintain a Common Position on Burma which has suspended most 
non-humanitarian or development programme aid.  It does, however, permit 
humanitarian interventions and several European donors recognised that 
tackling HIV/AIDS was critical to preventing the humanitarian situation 
worsening.   
 
                                            
27 Michael O’Dwyer DFID South East Asia 21 October 2004 
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Opportunities to address the problem 
 
Despite this difficult environment a number of opportunities to mount an 
effective HIV/AIDS programme were identified including:  
•  Public recognition (by Secretary 1-Gen. Khin Nyunt in December 2001) 
of the need for a coordinated effort to tackle HIV/AIDS in Myanmar 
•  a shared recognition on the part of donors and NGOs of the need for a 
strategic framework to address HIV/AIDS – a joint programme building 
upon the National Strategic Plan 
•  the willingness of some donors to fund such a programme 
•  In-country capacity (NGOs – national, local and government organised; 




Process for developing Joint Programme 
The Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS in Myanmar and the Fund for HIV/AIDS in 
Myanmar responded to these opportunities and to the growing awareness of 
the scale of the epidemic in Burma.  Development of the programme: 
 
•  built on policy commitments (including the signing by the Burmese 
Government of the UN General Assembly Special Session declaration 
of Commitment on AIDS)  
•  was taken forward by agreement of key stakeholders to develop a new  
strategy building on earlier work (including the National Plan) 
•  was led effectively by UN HIV/AIDS Expanded Theme Group who 
negotiated partnerships and convened a series of meetings to ensure 
that commitments were acted upon 
•  used international facilitators to bring together technical inputs from   
stakeholders (including Govt, GONGOs, INGOs, UN Agencies). 
 
 
Description of the Fund for HIV and AIDS in Myanmar (FHAM) and its 
relationship to the Joint Programme   
 
The resulting Joint Programme is a strategic plan which is complementary to, 
and supportive of, the National AIDS Plan.   The FHAM is a multi-million dollar 
pool provided by several bilateral donors (DFID, Norway and Sweden) to 
resource the Joint Programme.  It is managed by a secretariat based in 
UNAIDS and financially administered by UNDP.  The fund is used to support 
projects proposed by government, national and internationals NGOs and the 
private sector.  Projects are selected for funding on the basis of the value and 
cost effectiveness of the proposed work, and the capacity and track record of 
the potential implementer.  Proposal and selection processes are open and 
transparent, and designed to maximise the use of resources in the light of 
national needs and international best practice. 
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The Joint Programme operates as the de facto National AIDS Implementation 
Plan consistent with the “Three Ones” approach
28.  It depends on the active 
agreement of implementation partners (including government departments 
and structures such as the National AIDS Programme) to share information, 
co-ordinate planning and activities and contribute to the management and 
advisory bodies (the Expanded Theme Group, the Technical Working Group 
and 5 Component Groups corresponding to the 5 Joint Programme priority 
objectives).   
 
There is close synergy between the FHAM and the Joint Programme.  The 
Joint Programme provides a legitimate route to mobilise resources, and is the 
basis for a coordinated response.  FHAM can mobilise and resource a full 
range of service providers.  UNDP manages funds, meeting fiduciary needs.  
The UN Expanded Theme Group acts as the management board, and 
provides a forum to raise key policy issues (but policy change is slow – 
decision makers are difficult to access and do not appear to make decisions 
on basis of evidence and best practise).  UNAIDS acts as a secretariat to the 
Expanded Theme Group.  FHAM has supported the Joint Programme to 
develop a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework which 
involves all implementing partners. 
 
 
Key factors contributing to effective start up and implementation 
 
The FHAM/Joint Programme has undoubtedly been successful in allowing 
development stakeholders to work together with government agencies in a 
difficult political environment where the government is perceived by many 
stakeholders to be illegitimate.  Factors contributing to this success include: 
 
•  good timing: the process responded rapidly to signs of openness on the 
part of the government, and maintained momentum thereafter 
•  the development of the Joint Programme – building on a nationally 
owned plan but providing a framework for buy-in from a wide range of 
stakeholders (including the opposition National League for Democracy) 
•  the creation of space for policy dialogue in a difficult situation 
(accepting that this is limited but it is there nonetheless) 
•  development of effective operational systems: for technical review, 
Monitoring and evaluation, capacity building 
•  an approach which is flexible, explicitly aiming for coverage and impact 







                                            
28 The Three Ones refers to one national HIV/AIDS plan per country, one national body to co-ordinate HIV/AIDS 
activities and one system of monitoring and evaluation of HIV/AIDS work throughout the country.  It is a best practice 
model recommended by UNAIDS. 
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However, there are a number of issues which must now be addressed if the 
programme is to have meaningful impact on the course of the epidemic.   
Underlying these is the widespread agreement on the need for incremental 
engagement with government, maintaining pressure for policy change whilst 
ensuring that successful interventions are adequately resourced and taken to 
scale.   Specific questions include: 
 
•  Does the Joint Programme provide a sufficiently rigorous and shared 
framework to ensure an effective response?  (it has been criticised for 
being too broad, failing to define clear priorities) 
•  How can the response be taken to scale, ensuring sufficient coverage 
(of vulnerable populations with the services and commodities they need 
to protect themselves) to have impact? 
•  How can other donors best be mobilised to contribute to an effective 
response? (“selling” best practise?); and how can we take forward 
donor harmonisation, harnessing the resources of those donors 
operating outside FHAM. 
•  What should be the role of FHAM as Global Fund resources come on-
stream?  FHAM has done much to prepare the ground for the Global 
Fund in Burma, yet there are now concerns that the links are 
insufficient and that it might suit the government to marginalise FHAM 
in favour of Global Fund. 
•  How to can we ensure that the Monitoring and Evaluation framework 
becomes a powerful tool for accountability, better effectiveness and 
impact (limited information on this to date) and evidence based policy 
development? 
•  What more can be done to improve the policy framework and to 
increase policy dialogue, particularly with “hard to reach” decision 
makers (given the slow progress and resistance to change that has 





Plans are being developed for reviews of the Joint Programme and of funding 
modalities (including FHAM) early in 2005.  These reviews should provide 
some answers to the above challenges, strengthening the FHAM model. 
 
 
 
 